


ARMY

SEPTEMBER 1956
50¢






Grand Canyon Crash Mission

Army Aviation won the praise of government officials, airline executives and the press for the courage and skill of helicopter and light plane pilots in recovery work

Nine Soldier's Medals and seventeen Commendation pendants were awarded twenty-four Army commissioned and warrant officers (two officers received both awards) by Secretary of the Army Brucker in the presence of the Army Chief of Staff, General Taylor, on the White House

lawn. The twenty-four, all members of the 93d Transportation Helicopter Company and the 14th Army Aviation Company, were cited for their skill and daring in flying missions during the Grand Canyon crash recovery operation. Six Air Force officers were also decorated.



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Soon several hundred nuclear scientists and engineers from Lockheed's Georgia Division will move to the North Georgia mountain country. There on a vast site—some 40 miles from U.S. Air Force Plant No. 6 at Marietta, operated by Lockheed—will be built the nation's largest facility for the development of atomic-powered aircraft.

The exact status today of U. S. atomic plane



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SEPTEMBER 1956

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Atomic plane concept on a recent cover of Newsweek was not based in any way on Lockheed's Georgia Division ANP (Aircraft Nuclear Power) Project. That plane will really surprise you...

25,000 Lockheed stockholders in every state of the union learned in mid-August that sales reached approximately \$345 million for the first half of 1956. In a like period 20 years ago sales were less than one million...

Univac's newest cousin Si (for Scientific) will be the top quiz kid in the battery of analogue and digital brains at Lockheed's Missile Systems' Computer Center. Si, first Model 1103A Univac in use, "thinks" up to 100 times faster than other computers...

A nationally-known Los Angeles physician, after periods of intense nerve strain, goes to the airport, buys a round-trip ticket to New York on a Super Constellation, spends a quiet day at the Waldorf-Astoria, and comes back on the next flight. Says: "It relaxes me"...

Hercules C-130 performance data just released show that the USAF strong-man can haul 20 tons of cargo right on the contrails of a fast jet tactical force. 100 mph faster than present combat transports, Hercules climbs fully loaded to 2500 feet altitude in just one minute.

ARMY

SEPTEMBER 1956
Vol. 7 No. 2

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ARMY is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. ARMY strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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The Month's Cover

Throughout the Army noncommissioned officers' Leaders School use "learn by doing" method to give young leaders a chance to gain confidence in giving commands. The cover photo was made at Fort Belvoir by an Army Signal Corps photographer.

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Oklahoma-bred Maj. Gaddis went to Korea as commanding officer of the 8191st and 8192nd Army Helicopter Evacuation Units and of the first helicopter medical evacuation company.

Major Gaddis is currently director of the Rotary Wing Section of the Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. He is an Army Career pilot, the best kind of help and guidance for the Army's new aviation cadets.



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


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


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HYPERSONICS

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Realizing the increased complexity of some of the nation's current defense system problems, General Electric has formed the Special Defense Projects Department. The new department will act as a Company focal point for large, highly complex missile projects. Headquarters for the new department will be located near Philadelphia, Pa. This new department has responsibility for large defense systems that require the combined research, development, and manufacturing resources of many of General Electric's operating departments and laboratories.

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MATHEMATICS



THERMODYNAMICS

THE MONTH'S MAIL

Kick in the Pants by an NCO

• Why is the Department of the Army reluctant to eliminate deadwood NCO's? There are many soldiers wearing stripes who are not carrying their share of the burden; worse still, many of them can't perform their MOS jobs. Who are we trying to kid with all this business about revitalizing the NCO corps? "Prestige" is being used in instances where reward is more appropriate. Rewards should be given where earned, but you can't confer prestige upon anyone. . . .

The NCO must establish prestige himself. Any NCO who lacks the best qualities of a well-trained soldier will never have prestige.

There are few born instructors in the Army, but any NCO who cannot train himself to instruct should be reduced or eliminated. This is very seldom done, however; it is much easier to have a few incompetents do all the instructing in the company.

Is the Army going to attack the problem or must we be doomed to ride it out for twenty-year retirement, or quit now and cross off the twelve or more years as an unpleasant experience? Can anyone supply the answer?

MSGT. OWEN F. DEWSBURY
H&S Co, 66 Tank Bn
APO 34, NY

Command or Mission

• Colonel Legere's analysis in July ARMY almost penetrates when he gets to the concept that "Each service should be organized primarily on the basis of purpose. . . ." but there his analysis becomes fuzzy when he says ". . . that purpose being command of its elements" (page 25). General McClellan was in command of the Army of the Potomac and thought he was doing right well at "being [in] command of its elements"; but neither Lincoln nor the people could agree with him; they could not see that any purpose was being accomplished.

Now if Colonel Legere had said mission instead of purpose he might not have fallen into the error of using "command" as a synonym for "purpose." Obviously, the mission of a service cannot be to be in command of itself. You could give me as my purpose the command of a regiment; I could command it day in and day out without accomplishing anything; and you could not criticize me for I would

be complying with instructions to the fullest. No, the key is the mission—mission of accomplishment.

COL. LELAND B. KUHRE
Academy of Organizational Science
San Antonio, Texas

Make 'em Earn Their Decorations

• I agree with Colonel Advocate that our awards system needs a review, but not to have the V for Valor device placed on everything as he apparently wishes.

Colonel Advocate refers to the Navy and Marine Corps system of authorizing the V device to be worn on the Legion of Merit ribbon. I wonder if he is aware of the qualifications for this. As authorized, it does not denote an act of valor or gallantry in action, but is an automatic award when the recipient of the LM had received the decoration while serving with a combat unit. A staff officer serving with the JA section at division rear would be eligible for it. A few awards of the LM have been made strictly for gallantry in action. In this case the recipient should most definitely be awarded the V, but not in the case of a meritorious award just because he happened to serve in a combat division.

The purpose of awards and decorations has been nullified by the system, or lack of system, used throughout the Army. Many recipients of awards no longer look upon them with a sense of pride and accomplishment because of the way in which many higher decorations have been passed around indiscriminately. Many higher awards for valor were not given on the basis of the act but rather on the manner in which the citations were written.

I remember during World War II I submitted a recommendation for the Bronze Star for one of my men for knocking out two German tanks and killing the crews of both. It was disapproved because it was that man's job to knock out tanks and kill Germans. A couple of years later I read an award of the Medal of Honor to a man in another division for knocking out one German tank and killing five enemy. Incidentally, my man ended up with nine tanks to his credit, and finally got the Bronze Star.

A type of citation that makes me burn is one which awards a medal for valor to officers for leadership. Time after time we see citations which only indicate that

the officer was merely doing his job of leading. It has always been my conviction that officers have one purpose: to lead their men. Further, when he displays leadership in combat he is only justifying the faith placed in him by the American people and the President.

* * *

How many times have we heard of units being allotted a certain number of medals for distribution? For example, a division would allot, say, five DSCs and twelve Silver Stars to each regiment. Regiments in turn would allot so many to each battalion, keeping a share for distribution among its headquarters. Must soldiers who perform acts of gallantry above and beyond the call of duty be penalized because the battalion had only one DSC and three Silver Stars to award? That is why we see men wearing the Bronze Star with V for performing the same act done by another who received the Medal of Honor.

Colonel Advocate says, "Simulated awards for conduct in sham battle stimulate interest in striving for the real thing in combat." Do soldiers perform acts of heroism in combat in the belief that they will be awarded a medal for it? I have always believed that such acts were a reflection of the training received before combat, and the morale and discipline of the soldier and his unit. I believe every combat officer will agree with me that such acts are not inspired by the wish to earn an award.

Let's overhaul our combat awards system by instituting a system that will insure an award only on the basis of the deed performed and not on the wording of the citation. Let's discontinue the practice of hiring professional writers whose flowery phrases in the final analyses mean nothing and accept the simple version of what happened. Finally, let's discontinue the practice of awarding combat decorations to officers simply for doing what they are supposed to do: lead their men.

LT. COLONEL INFANTRY

• I agree with Colonel Advocate that this is the time to review our system of decorations. Since most of our nation's military decorations are common to all services, the review should cover Army, Navy and Air Force. His statement that the system must be understood before it can be properly implemented is significant.

As a starting point, I submit the following, which are personal conclusions arrived at in the light of my experience.

The primary or basic purpose of decorations is to provide tangible public recognition of valuable services.

... it is my opinion that the following general policies should be adopted:

Military decorations are intended primarily for the recognition of wartime acts and services.

The most important and effective use of military decorations is to provide maximum recognition for that comparatively small proportion of the armed forces which is engaged in combat.

... provision should be made for adequate recognition of meritorious peacetime acts and services.

Not more than one U.S. decoration should be awarded for the same act or service.

Different decorations should be awarded members of the armed forces and civilians.

Heroism and meritorious service should

be recognized by different decorations.

Combat heroism and noncombat heroism decorations awarded to members of the armed forces should be different. No such distinction should be made in the case of heroism awards for civilians because of their status as noncombatants.


Decorations should be awarded with different degrees of liberality corresponding to the degree of merit of the act of heroism or meritorious service.

Military decorations for civilians should be comparable to those awarded members of the armed forces.

COL. JOHN L. AMES, JR.
American-Korean Foundation
345 East 46 St
New York 17, NY

Infantry School Quarterly

• We are very much interested in the officer whose plea for "more articles on the company and battalion level" turned up in July's Month's Mail. We wish to let him know that we still have a forum for this type of material: the *Infantry School Quarterly*. This official publica-



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tion of The Infantry School concentrates on material for the officer and noncommissioned officer at regimental level and below, with emphasis on the "below."

We agree wholeheartedly with the mission of ARMY as reflected in your editorial comment to "Name Withheld's" plea. ARMY is doing an outstanding job in presenting current critical problems regarding national defense policy, the role of the Army and other vital matters of interest to the Army.

LT. COL. STEPHEN H. WHITE

Editor

Infantry School Quarterly
Fort Benning, Ga.

The Army National Guard

• I have just returned from field training with the 107th RCT, NYNG, and have finished reading the first instalment of the special report on the National Guard by Bruce Jacobs in the August issue.

Lieutenant Jacobs has done an outstanding job in reporting accurately the existing state of the National Guard, and ARMY is to be congratulated for having the foresight to direct him "to find out what makes the National Guard tick."

MAJOR STEVEN A. DUNNE

50 Broadway
New York, N. Y.

• "The National Guard: Our Really

Ready Reserve," in the August issue, was an excellent one, and most comprehensive. I'm looking forward to Bruce Jacob's second article in the series.

LT. WILLIAM J. KEOGH

PRO, VtNG

Montpelier, Vt.

• I take exception to Lieutenant Bruce Jacob's article in the August issue. He appears to contend that the NG, at unit level, is considerably more ready than the USAR; that there is conflict between the NG and USAR at unit level; that the NG is fearful of losing some of their mobilization assignments to USAR; that NG officers are switching over to USAR units for quick promotions; that RFA 55 discriminates against the NG and helps the USAR; that the NG is handicapped by shortage of personnel, on full time, to handle administration, maintenance and supply; that the NG is snowed under with paperwork, files, reports, etc.

I have served as an advisor with the USAR for three years, and would like to make these points:

While it is true that the NG is more ready, at this time, than the USAR, the gap is getting smaller and smaller all the time. I question the statement that the total NG is more ready than the USAR as a whole. Consider the fact that over 50 per cent of the Guard (figures from the article) are in the category of never hav-

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ing had active duty and are not required to have any active duty. The men in the USAR are required to complete either six months or two years of active duty; this would indicate that, man for man, the USAR is better trained than the NG (this does not consider officers).

During the time I have served with civilian components I have not observed a single instance of conflict between the NG and the USAR. . . . Certainly it is true that individual members of units talk up their own (it will be a sad day when they don't!), but no thinking individual runs down the other fellow.

Any inference that the NG is afraid it won't get a share of the next war borders on the fantastic. During the past two disagreements, there seems to have been plenty of the opposition to go around.

USAR officers also switch over to the NG for quick promotion. It runs both ways, and depends on local conditions. . . .

Since the NG can and does recruit under RFA, I fail to see how it works in favor of the USAR. Surely no thinking Guardsman wants to do away with the USAR. After all, they both follow the same training program and they will both be there when the whistle blows.

The NG, at present, is authorized three times the personnel, on full-time duty, to perform its administration, supply and maintenance as are USAR units.

Lives there a soldier with seat so dead that never to himself has said: Who in hell thinks up all this paperwork?

Surely it would be more in the interests of our country to remember that we are all on the same team, and that the people we are supposed to fight are not in the NGUS or USAR.

SFC WILLIAM F. CAYLOR

USAR Armory
Norfolk 4, Va.

Principles

• After some study of our military policy since 1776, I have come to the conclusion that the cliché "history repeats itself" is an inevitable truth. If I had the ability to write I believe I could document the ever-repeated fact that the United States violates the principles of war during so-called peacetime to a greater degree than during wartime.

It may be naïve, but how much better it would be if we measured our peacetime programs, plans, policies and decisions, in DOD and Congress, using the nine Principles of War as a yardstick, rather than service and branch self-interest or political expediency.

As a beginning, should we have the following certificate added to all programs, plans, policies and decisions? "The above does (not) violate the Principles of War with no (the following) excep-

tions. The size of the type used for this certificate would be determined by the BOB.

PLAIN DAN

Opposed to 'Fade Away'


• I simply must comment favorably on General Randle's "Freshen Up the Label" in the July issue.

It happens that I was one of those who, in "old days" (1920-27), worked with the late Col. Oliver L. Spaulding, Captain George C. Chandler, and Mr. Arthur E. DuBois in compiling the outline histories and building the coats-of-arms of the color- and standard-bearing outfits of the Army. That work established in record form the glorious deeds and brought to light the antecedents and descent of these old outfits. There was *esprit de corps*, like a vein of gold, running through all of that program.

In more years of service than I care to state, I talked to many young draft-age men, many pre-inductees. They were, let us say, on the fence as to whether to wait for the draft or volunteer. When I impressed them with the historical background which these old outfits had to sustain them in any mission they might be called upon to perform, it clicked.

AUNTY FADEAWAY

(Continued on page 41)



Officers and
Senior N.C.O.s.*

(*top 3 grades, married
and at least 25 years old)

this COUPON can SAVE YOU
UP TO **\$30** OF EVERY **\$100**

YOU SPEND ON
AUTO INSURANCE

SAVINGS You save up to 30% from standard rates because you eliminate from your premium the cost of maintaining the customary agency system and all membership fees.

SERVICE You are protected by the Standard Automobile Policy. You also enjoy immediate claim service from over 650 professional claim representatives located in every sizeable city in the U. S. and its possessions.

SECURITY Year after year, 98 of every 100 policyholders renew their auto insurance with Government Employees Insurance Company. Experience has proven to over 350,000 policyholders that there is no finer insurance at any price.

30%

OVER 650

98 OUT OF 100

GOING OVERSEAS?

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE BLDG., WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

Name _____ Age _____

☐ Single ☐ Married (No. of children _____)

Residence Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ County _____ State _____

Location of Car _____ Rank or Grade _____

| Yr. | Make | Model(Dlx., etc.) | Cyl. | Body Style | Cost | Purchase Date | <input type="checkbox"/> New | <input type="checkbox"/> Used |
|-----|------|-------------------|------|------------|------|---------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | | |

1. Additional operators under age 25 in household at present time:

| Age | Relation | Marital Status | No. of Children | % of Use |
|-----|----------|----------------|-----------------|----------|
| | | | | |

2. (a) Days per week auto driven to work? _____ One way distance is _____ miles.

(b) Is car used in any occupation or business? (Excluding to and from work) ☐ Yes ☐ No

3. Estimated mileage during next year? _____ My present policy expires _____ / _____ / _____

Include information and rates on overseas insurance in country of _____

065



GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY


Capital Stock Company not affiliated with U. S. Government
Washington 5, D. C.

MAIL TODAY FOR RATES

No Obligation • No Agent Will Call

$$\frac{L \times FC}{T} = C-123$$

L = Load
FC = Field Capacity
T = Time



Battle Situation: 10 105mm howitzers, with ammunition and gun crews, plus 10 bulldozers and operators must be delivered to an enemy-surrounded field. **Field conditions:** Ungraded field, sandy and eroded; 1000 ft. at its widest dimension. Assume 15 mph velocity wind. Troops must be ground landed. **Solution:** Load 20 Fairchild C-123

assault transports at supply center 450 miles away; take 3 hours to fly to destination. Land your airplanes 8 seconds apart—allow 700 ft. ground roll for each.

Theorem: Fairchild C-123 rugged performance and reliability is proved daily in stateside assault and overseas logistical missions.



FAIRCHILD

AIRCRAFT DIVISION • HAGERSTOWN 10, MARYLAND

A Division of Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation

...WHERE THE FUTURE IS MEASURED IN LIGHT-YEARS!

The Commanding General, Sixth Army tells us that

THE ROTC PAYS OFF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT N. YOUNG

IN the past several months I have visited nearly every senior ROTC unit in Sixth Army. This has been a most rewarding experience. I have found that the ROTC is attracting the finest young men on the campuses. Applications for the Advanced Course in most instances are large enough to permit the PMSTs to be selective in accepting students for the senior courses. This is a healthy situation, and the challenge encourages even more of the better students to apply. It is not unusual to find the president of the student body, class presidents, outstanding athletes, and other campus leaders holding high rank in the cadet corps.

The ROTC is accomplishing its mission in an encouraging manner. Each year approximately 14,000 educated young graduates are available to enter our reserve forces. The ROTC is also our greatest source of Regular Army officer material. This year approximately 525 distinguished military graduates of the ROTC program will accept Regular Army commissions. This number compares with the approximately 355 who will enter the Regular Army from the Military Academy.

During World War II approximately 100,000 ROTC graduates served as officers in all grades from second lieutenant to five-star general. That five-star general, General of the Army George C. Marshall, in his final report upon the conduct of World War II, stated: "The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the

fact that during the lean postwar years over 100,000 Reserve officers had been continuously trained, largely the product of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. These Reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time. Without their assistance the [mobilization] program could not have been carried out except in a superficial manner."

THIS year, for the second time, approximately one third of the ROTC graduates will be called to active duty for six months' training and revert to the Reserve for the remainder of their obligation. The other two-thirds will serve for two years. The students themselves were permitted to express preference for two years' active duty or six months' active duty for training. In the majority of cases, the individual's desires closely paralleled the active-duty requirements of the Army.

Applications for commissions in the Regular Army are more than double the number that can be accepted. Thus, a selection can be made and outstanding officer material is assured. This is also encouraging since there is intensive competition for the same young men from industry, business, and commerce.

The pay being offered for such a civilian career is, in some instances, greater than the pay of a second lieutenant, and the chances for early and substantial increase are far greater than the Army can offer.

The entire ROTC budget for fiscal 1956 was only \$16.2 million. The Army spends approximately \$3,800 for each ROTC graduate. In addition, many thousands of other young men receive the two years of the Basic Course. For these funds the Department of the Army obtains nearly 14,000 Reserve officers per year as well as its greatest source of Regular Army officer material. The graduates themselves have invested an average of \$5,000 per individual for their university education.

The ROTC is accomplishing its mission and is a most important military program.

Lieutenant General Robert N. Young is CG of Sixth Army. He enlisted in 1918 and came into the Regular Army from the Reserve in 1923 after earning his AB at the University of Maryland. He served in the ETO during World War II and commanded the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Later he was Commandant of The Infantry School and G1, Department of the Army. He has been a member of the Executive Councils of the U.S. Infantry Association and AUSA, and was a Vice President of AUSA.



THE DE HAVILLAND U1-A OTTER

In Service with the United States Army

For Para-troop training the Otter can carry 10 fully equipped combat troops and drops can be made at speeds ranging from 60 to 140 mph.

Designed and built by

THE DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT OF CANADA LIMITED

Postal Station "L", Toronto, Ontario

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3-56

Second Annual Meeting

ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY

Sheraton-Park Hotel

Washington, D.C.

October 25 • 26 • 27

When you join your fellow members at Washington's Sheraton-Park Hotel during 25-27 October the Second Annual Meeting of AUSA, you'll be getting a preview of the U.S. Army in the age of guided missiles and nuclear weapons.



MAJ. GEN.
J. D. O'CONNELL

The Annual Meeting Committee, under the chairmanship of Major General J. D. O'Connell, have put together a fast-paced program which will review for you the

latest trends and ideas for a mobile, flexible, hard-hitting army of the future.

You'll hear major addresses by Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Army's Chief of Staff, and General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General of Continental Army Command.

You'll sit in on presentations and discussions by the principal Department of the Army staff agencies on the whole broad picture of the Army of the future. From operations you'll get some of the new ideas on how guided missiles and

nuclear weapons will affect future organization, tactics and strategy and new concepts of the battlefield of future warfare.

The Army's most important weapon now and in the future—the soldier—will come in for his rightful share too. There will be discussions on personnel trends, career incentives, and career management.

The progress, problems and plans for the continuing development of a strong ready reserve force of National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve will be spotlighted in a discussion Thursday afternoon.

There will be presentations and discussions centering on how we supply, feed and provision the army of the future.

Lieutenant General James M. Gavin's Research and Development group will discuss new and up-coming missiles, weapons, vehicles, and other equipment.

You'll have an afternoon at Fort Myer to see exhibits and demonstrations of new weapons and equipment put on by the Technical and Administrative Services.

Among the new features of this year's meeting are the Industrial Exhibits. More than 16,000 square feet of exhibit space at the Sheraton-Park Hotel has been taken over by industry to show the trends and developments in their particular fields. More than fifty firms representing all major segments of industry and commerce will be participating with some really interesting exhibits, that you won't want to miss.

One of the most provocative sessions (if our experience last year is any indication) will be the Panel Discussion set for Saturday morning, 27 October. This will be a panel discussion headed by a group of prominent civilian leaders examining the vital role of the Army in national security and the relationships of the Army with the various segments of the civilian community.

Elsewhere in this issue you'll find an announcement of the new Council of Trustees of the Association. The govern-

ment of the Association will be handed over to the new Council during the business meeting on Saturday morning. Lieutenant General Walter L. Weible, outgoing President of the Association, will make a report on the status and progress of the Association during this same meeting. Resolutions and other Association business will be considered, and you as a member will have the opportunity to lend your voice and ideas to future work of AUSA.

Your social life will not be neglected either. The first evening of the meeting, you'll be invited to attend a reception for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. You'll attend a luncheon on Friday for all members and guests. The Second Annual Banquet will be held Friday night, with Secretary of the Army Brucker as principal speaker. The U.S. Army Band and Chorus will be on hand for your entertainment. On Saturday you'll attend the wind-up luncheon to hear General Willard G. Wyman speak.

Following the exhibits and demonstration at Fort Myer, you'll witness the colorful pageantry of a retreat parade by the famous 3d Infantry "Old Guard" Regiment, coupled with a thrilling fly-over by Army aviators.

To help you make the most of your Washington visit, the Association has made arrangements with Career Management and The Adjutant General to set up appointments for you to discuss your own problems or to review your 201 file.

Throughout the incubation period of the Annual Meeting plans, the Committee set as its goal a program jam-packed with interest and entertainment for the membership. The influx of advance registrations indicate that they have more than accomplished their objective.

We'd suggest that you use the card provided to send in your advance registration as soon as you can. We're expecting a full house, and we don't want any of our members to miss the fun.



PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

- **Headline Speakers:**
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Wilber M. Brucker
 - Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
General Maxwell D. Taylor
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 - New Weapons and Equipment
 - Personnel Trends
 - Career Incentives
 - Reserve Forces
- 16,000 Square feet of new Industrial Exhibits
- Displays and Demonstrations of new and experimental weapons, vehicles and equipment by the Technical and Administrative Services
- Reception for the Secretary of

REGISTER NOW

To be sure that you get in on all of the functions scheduled for the 2nd Annual Meeting, you should register as far in advance as you can. It will be possible to register on arrival but registration applications must be handled on a first-come, first-served basis. To register in advance, here's all the dope you need.

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Check or money order covering the cost of registration and tickets requested *must accompany application*. Indicate billet desired but *do not* send advance payment for billet.
- 3 Advance registration and reservations will be accepted from members only. If you are not currently a member, you can add \$5.00 to your check for 1 year's dues and be enrolled at the same time you register.
- 4 Advance mail registrations and reservations will be confirmed by mail and your registration badge, billet reservation, and tickets may be picked up at the AUSA Registration Desk—Sheraton-Park Hotel, beginning 1200 24 October 1956.

ADVANCE REGISTRATION AND RESERVATION APPLICATION

2nd Annual Meeting—Association U. S. Army

MAIL TO: Association of the U. S. Army, Attn: Annual Meeting
1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

PLEASE PRINT
OR TYPE

NAME _____ RANK _____
LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL MILITARY MEMBERS

ADDRESS _____

Enclosed please find payment of \$ _____ for the following:

CIRCLE APPLICABLE PORTIONS

REGISTRATION: Military Members \$8.00

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BANQUET TICKETS:

_____ Military Members @ \$7.00 each. _____ Civilian @ \$10.00 each

MEMBERSHIP DUES for 1 year \$5.00 (for non-members).

SEE OTHER SIDE FOR BILLET RESERVATION

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Following the exhibits and demonstra-

BILLET: Indicate desired billet but do not send advance payment.

Sheraton-Park Hotel*

Rates for Active Military

Rates for Non-Active

| | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Single Room (1 person) | \$ 7.00 | \$ 7.50; \$ 8.50; \$ 9.50 |
| Double Room (2 persons) | \$10.00 | \$11.00; \$12.00; \$13.00; \$14.00 |
| Double Room (3 persons) | \$13.00 | \$14.00; \$15.00; \$16.00; \$17.00 |
| 1 Bedroom Suites | \$17.50; \$18.50 | \$17.50; \$18.50; \$20.50; \$22.50 |
| | \$20.50; \$22.50 | |
| 2 Bedroom Suites | \$40.00; \$45.00 | \$40.00; \$45.00 |

*When Sheraton-Park rooms are filled, AUSA will endeavor to obtain comparable accommodations for you at another hotel.



Bachelor Officer Quarters (Military Posts)

Single Rooms only \$1.00 per day (for Military Members only)

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 - Personnel Trends
 - Career Incentives
 - Reserve Forces
- 16,000 Square feet of new Industrial Exhibits
- Displays and Demonstrations of new and experimental weapons, vehicles and equipment by the Technical and Administrative Services
- Reception for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff
- Annual Banquet
- Two Luncheons



LT. GEN. WALTER L. WEIBLE

SEPTEMBER 1956

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- 5 Members desiring hotel reservations will be accommodated at the Sheraton-Park insofar as space permits. When all rooms at the Sheraton-Park are reserved, AUSA will endeavor to obtain comparable accommodations at another Washington hotel.
- 6 The Sheraton-Park Hotel requires presentation of *active-duty ID card*, if not in uniform, to obtain special military rates.
- 7 If you desire a firm appointment with Career Management or an appointment to examine your 201 file please write a note accompanying your registration and reservation application indicating your desires.

USE CARD PROVIDED TO REGISTER

THE ARMY'S MONTH

Moderation Isn't for the Soldier

OUR political leaders agree that this is an era of moderation. No philosophers have been heard to dispute it and our modern soothsayers—the pollsters and the electronic brains—seem to have given it the stamp of their approval. So moderation it is.

Trouble is that immoderate dosages of moderation can lead to complacency, a condition which begets all manner of evils, not the least of which is self-delusion. And that, in a world shared with fanatical immoderates who know what they want and intend to get it, is about as dangerous a way of life as can be imagined.

The soldier who seriously contemplates the world today can have little hope that moderation will ease his sworn duty of defending the nation. There is a need here for an axiom or principle which would state that the more moderate a society or a nation becomes the more immoderate the soldier must be in his devotion to his duty. His is the task of keeping a wary eye on the enemy whose soft blandishments are aimed at promoting the complacency

that will give him a decisive advantage over the free world.

What does the soldier see today when he peers beyond the smiling countenances of the Kremlin?

He takes note of the announcement that the Soviet armed forces are to be reduced by a total of 1,840,000 men by May 1957 (this includes the 640,000 announced late in 1955).

But he also notes that there is to be only a comparatively tiny reduction in the number of combat units.

He recalls that Zhukov and other Soviet military leaders have publicly proclaimed the increase in fire power of their tactical units.

He remembers that in the last couple of years the number of tanks in Soviet armored divisions have been doubled and that all ground combat units have been motorized.

There is also the Soviet Army drive for air mobility. Its helicopter developments—notably the big “Horse”—have been acknowledged by American military leaders. Members of General Twining's party saw Soviet assault transports similar to our C-123 Provider.

The soldier notes that while his countrymen are told over and over again that the Badger and Bison bombers of the Soviet air arm are threats to their security (which they are), they are not told that the Soviets have reduced the number of planes in their long-range bomber force and are increasing the number of fighter and attack planes available for air defense and close support of army units.

He notices too that Soviet military thinking (see page 59) has over-thrown the fraudulent theories of Stalin and is again pursuing sound doctrines.

He sees no decline in the military strength of the satellites, notably Red China with an army of 3.5 million men.

But he is most impressed of all by the evidence that the leaders of the Soviet Union have no intention of depriving



During an Hawaiian exercise Major General Edwin J. Messinger showed his 25th Infantry Division that the Old Man could keep up with the best of them

Chapters and ROTC Companies

At a special meeting of the Executive Council on 9 August, these regulations to govern Chapters and ROTC Companies were approved: Chapters may be organized in any city, or on any post, where fifty members of the Association will sign a petition asking for a charter. ROTC Companies may be organized at any institution of College, Military Preparatory, or Junior College level upon submission of a petition that bears the signatures of fifteen cadets or of 20 per cent of the cadets enrolled in the last two years of the ROTC program, whichever number is larger. Members interested in organizing chapters or companies should write to the Secretary, AUSA, for copies of the Regulations.




Every wolf would like to eat a porcupine. Few of them get around to it.

What makes the porcupine's meat so good, of course, is the fact that he doesn't have to do any running. Wolves, by and large, are an ill-tempered, frustrated lot, while you almost never see a neurotic porcupine.

He figures it's cheaper to carry a quiver full of arrows than to get ulcers from hiding. There are predators of the sky, too, and helping keep them in a state of frustration is REPUBLIC'S job building THUNDER-CRAFT.



REPUBLIC AVIATION



FARMINGDALE, LONG ISLAND, N. Y.

Designers and Builders of the Incomparable **THUNDER-CRAFT**



When mechanical trouble forced down an Army H-23 helicopter not far from Mt. Vernon, a H-21 from nearby Fort Belvoir went out to get it. Here it is shown high over the Potomac river. Tail boom of the disabled craft was taken off and carried inside the H-21.

Changes in Command Chart Photorecord

For those of you who have posted for handy reference the Department of Army Command Chart published in our February 1956 issue, we publish below the cuts of two officers who have been assigned to D/A. These cuts can be clipped out and pasted on the Photorecord chart in the proper positions.

Other changes will be published as they occur.



MAJ. GEN. E. C. ITSCHNER
Chief of Engineers



MAJ. GEN. R. A. SCHOW
ACofS, Intelligence

In the first Army-AF exercises in Europe using the Fairchild C-123 Provider assault transport, men of the 10th Infantry Division poured out of one of the aircraft after it had made a simulated assault landing on a landing strip near Kitzingen.



themselves of a powerful army in being, ready to march at any time.

It is impossible for the serious soldier to feel very moderate about these things. And his concern is vastly increased as he views the course of events on his side of the Iron Curtain during the summer of 1956.

He senses the undeniable compulsion towards disarmament of the political leaders of the Western nations. He sees a weakening in NATO and a contraction of American power in the Far East.

He is aghast at reports that U.S. Army strength may be reduced by 200,000 or more men in the next couple of years. He can see nothing moderate in such a weakening of a dominant arm.

And though the soldier himself be most advanced in his advocacy of new weapons and new organizations, he is disturbed by reports that the projected reductions will be a "streamlining of combat units" and the removal of surplus fat from the support units. Such talk disturbs him for it has been his experience that these phrases have always been euphemisms for combat incapability. He need go no further back in history than 1949 to recall the streamlining and "fat cutting" that resulted in understrength two-battalion regiments being sent to Korea in 1950. The soldier does not need to be of retirement age personally to recall when it was commonplace for more officers of an infantry rifle company to be on special duty of a support nature than there were with the company. His seniors can assure him that the work of support units does not cease when they disappear but is performed by combat units with a consequent reduction of fighting efficiency.

It would seem in this late summer of 1956 that the force of these facts requires the soldier to buck the moderate current of American life and to be immoderate in his insistence on maintaining a military posture that will insure the security of the nation.

General Officer Shifts

Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither to CONARC as Dep. CG for Reserve forces. . . . Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge to Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand. . . . Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Newman to CONARC. . . . Maj. Gen. Eugene W. Ridings to OTIG. . . . Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Cooper to Hq. USA-REUR. . . . Brig. Gen. Louis W. Truman to Chief, MAAG, Pakistan. . . . Brig. Gen. David W. Heiman to Office, Chief of Engineers. . . . Brig. Gen. Legare K. Tarant to Hq. 6th AAA Reg. Comd., Fort Baker, Calif. . . . Brig. Gen. Robert H. Booth to Hq. First Army. . . . Brig. Gen. Paul A. Disney to Hq. USA Trng. Cen. (Armor), Fort Knox, Ky.

Retirements. Brig. Gen. Harris Jones . . . Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Barnes . . . Brig. Gen. William L. Bayer . . . Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes . . . Maj. Gen. Claude B. Mickelwait . . . Brig. Gen. Arthur H. Bender . . . Maj. Gen. William E. Waters . . . Brig. Gen. Richard W. Mayo . . . Brig. Gen. Francis E. Howard . . . Brig. Gen. John R. Wood . . . Brig. Gen. Frederick P. Munson.

HE SHALL HAVE MOBILITY WHEREVER HE GOES

He is a soldier in the army of the atomic age. Nuclear weapons have not made him obsolete; he remains the final decisive element.

But to fight and to win he must have mobility—in three dimensions. Vertol helicopters—such as the H-21 "Workhorse"—give him this freedom of motion, of action.

Now he can be flown into position, reinforced, or redeployed in a matter of hours. He can be supplied, rearmed and fed—and Vertol "flying ambulances" can rush him to the combat hospitals for earliest treatment.

The rugged, reliable H-21 can airlift 20 fully-equipped soldiers, or, for medical evacuation, 12 litter cases with attendant. In its cabin, more than two tons of cargo can be carried. As a "flying crane" it can ferry bulk equipment over rivers and mountains on its external cargo sling.

Performance—versatility; these are the reasons why the Armed Forces have consistently picked Vertol helicopters for the toughest jobs.



*Outstanding job opportunities
are available for engineers*

Join Tomorrow's Army Today

VERTOL
Aircraft Corporation

MORTON, PENNSYLVANIA
FORMERLY PIASECKI HELICOPTER CORPORATION

The Fight at Snook

Practically isolated at the end of a long and bony ridge, the outpost was manned by men green to Korea and combat. But seven American riflemen patched together a fire fight that turned back a strong Chinese thrust

BRIGADIER GENERAL S. L. A. MARSHALL

Illustrated by H. Garver Miller

EVEN the name of the place had a blessed appropriateness. According to Webster, "snook" means to smell, to nose about, to lurk and to lie in ambush. It can also mean "a thumbing of the nose."

Either or both definitions could have been in the mind of the unknown but scholarly GI who first looked at the outpost and said, "Let's call it Snook." The tiny knob interrupted the otherwise flat bottom of the Yokkokchon valley in awesome isolation. It was an act of deliberate defiance that the Americans insisted on garrisoning it.

Yet there was something about Outpost Snook which charmed the eye and soothed the senses. The other outpost hills all appeared melancholy. Snook alone looked chipper. It was as if God had made this funny little place just to provide special care for the watchmen of the night.

As the most thorough, accurate and exciting reporter and interpreter of small-combat actions America has produced, **Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall** is widely known both here and abroad for his World War II and Korean conflict studies of American men in combat. This article is a chapter from his forthcoming book, *Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953*, to be published in November 1956 by William Morrow & Company, at \$5.00.

Snook was joined to the big ridge of the main line by an attenuated and sharply descending ridge finger of such tapering narrowness that from the high ground it looked like a dinosaur's tail stretching into enemy country. The last knob on the tail was Outpost Snook. From the main line of resistance, a communication trench ran 1,100 yards down the spine of the animal to serve the peewee fortress. It was of such depth as to prohibit supporting weapons being fired from it. So steep were the slopes of the finger and so sharp-edged its crest that the trench embankments did well to withstand a pounding by mortar fire. Other than by entering the trench itself, the enemy could not use the upper heights of the finger to take Outpost Snook from the rear. But because the finger ran straight and true from the hilltop, fires from behind the big ridge could beat upon the sides of the extension while reinforcing infantrymen descended to Snook via the deep trench.

Atop the knob there was room for just one bunker, which was called the CP, and a straight-running thirty-foot sandbagged trench which could accommodate not more than ten men. To cover and strengthen the battalion's position, eight outguard (listening) posts were mounted in an arc around the base of Snook, closer to the enemy than was the CP by an average distance of two hundred yards. (See *Sketch, page 24*) There were two or three men



in each outguard post around Snook.

By reason of its extreme isolation, limited means, and extraordinary terrain, Snook had therefore more the nature of a stationary patrol than of a fortified redoubt. The knob was neither wired in nor protected by minefields, as the position was too cramped and the slope too steep to permit it. If hit, the garrison would survive mainly by its own power.

FOR the greater part of two years, the Chinese Communists had looked hungrily at Snook, knowing that if they could grab it, they had a sally port to the main ridge. But while they continued to probe and hit every other outpost position, they left Snook very much alone.

On the night of 15-16 May 1953, Snook was defended by eight men from the 3d Platoon of Company A, 17th Infantry. Sergeant George Tran-

seau, who was in command, had seen Snook for the first time late that afternoon. The others already had spent one night on the ground. Including Transeau, the average length of service of the garrison and outguard was thirteen days. Of the eight men atop the knob, four were new replacements.

All the outguards were tied in with the CP by a telephone hot loop. The same open circuit kept battalion in continuing touch with developments at Snook. If, for example, one outguard got on the loop and cried warning to Transeau, all other outguards heard it, as did the CP people on the company hill, and Major Acuff at battalion.

At exactly 2304, Transeau heard a rattle of fire from somewhere along his immediate front. The sounds were muffled and at first they conveyed to Transeau's mind nothing of great importance, though he immediately reported what he had heard to Acuff.

While he was talking to Acuff, a number of the outguards cut in and sounded off on the wire. They had heard the firing; but they had seen nothing; they wanted to know what the shooting was about. Transeau counted them off, one by one. There was a conspicuous blank; Outguard No. 14 hadn't reported. Quickly, the other outguards were calling it to his attention: "We're hearing nothing from 14; what's happening?"

There was good reason for the silence. At Outguard No. 14 three men had met sudden death. Afterward, the look of their bodies indicated that they had all been killed by one submachine-gunner, where they sat, and after that, grenaded for good measure. But the men on Snook did not then know that. Transeau reported to Acuff only that he could hear nothing from 14.

Acuff told him: "Use the other outguards and reinforce toward the vacu-



um." Otherwise sensible advice, it underestimated the weight and speed of the threat. Time and development had already closed off the chance for any such maneuver, as Transeau realized before he had time to repeat Acuff's order.

Private Harold Gardner was on the hot loop now, talking to Transeau from Outguard No. 15: "We see them. There are fifty to sixty of them. They have overrun 14 and are now heading straight toward us. We've got to get out."


Transeau said: "OK; run for the hill as fast as you can!" Acuff heard him say it, and realized that his own present task was to alert the supporting heavy fires that would save Snook, leaving it to Transeau's judgment whether the other outguards should be withdrawn.

Privates Gardner and Bae Yon Bee started for Snook on a dead run. But the main body of Chinese was already across their line to the CP. So they ran diagonally upward, intending to get into the commo trench between Snook and the main hill.

WHOLLY occupied with his communications which kept him inside the bunker, Transeau didn't have time to spell out the situation to the seven men behind him who were in the trench garrisoning the knob. They had to play out the show by instinct and according to what they had been taught in basic training; so did the men in the outguard posts on the low ground.

The truly remarkable thing is that, without exception, all hands decided to remain where they were, fire if they saw anything that looked like a target, and move only when ordered. The voices they had heard over the hot loop were steady, and that fact steadied them. They had made their personal decisions even before Transeau said over the phone: "We've got a fight on Snook; stay where you are and give it all you can."

To Privates Roy L. Howell and Robert Cayl, who were having their first time under fire in the Snook trench, it was momentarily disconcerting that no warning had come and that no one said: "Look here! You are in a fight. There is the enemy. Now fire!" That was more or less how they had expected it would be. But the noise of "two or three burp guns" had sounded unfamiliar to their ears. And within four or five minutes after they had heard the first shots, enemy mortar shells,



arriving ten or twelve to the minute, began to shake the earth near them. They decided, on their own, that Snook and their personal fortunes were in jeopardy and that they had best do something about it.

Howell heard a Browning automatic rifle (fired by one of the outguards) go into action. He said: "When I heard the friendly fire, I came out of my trance. Until then, though I had heard enemy fire, my reaction was still as if I were watching a movie."

Howell was within arm's length of the CP. He walked five or six yards and looked down the slope. At a distance of about forty yards, he could see "from twenty-five to thirty men" climbing the shale bank toward him. They were in "gang formation" and were moving obliquely across his front as if their purpose was to gain a slightly defiladed saddle and enter the trench on the rear of Snook. As fast as he could load and pull trigger, he fired four clips from his M1 and saw "several" Chinese fall. Others changed direction when he opened fire, and dropping to their bellies, crawled toward him. They yelled: "Cease fire!" as they came on. Others among them cried: "Spread out! Spread out!" Though they spoke clear English, it did not disconcert him. He dropped his rifle and put his three grenades on the rampart. When the leading Chinese got to within twenty yards of him, he unpinned his grenades and threw. He heard screams and saw two Chinese go limp and lie still while the others scrambled down slope and were lost in the dark.

When the targets vanished, Howell quit firing.

Private Robert Cayl was about ten yards from Howell. He was lying in the trench and trying to rest when the first shots were fired. After Howell opened fire, Cayl arose and tried to look over the trench wall. The Chinese whom Howell was fighting were closer still to Cayl. But the trench had been dug unevenly. Where Cayl stood, it was deeper, and Cayl was a shorter man than Howell; on tiptoe, he still could not see beyond the revetment. So he dropped to a squatting position and waddled a few yards, still wondering what he should do. That brought him within a couple of paces of Howell, who was still firing down slope. So far, Cayl had seen no sign of the enemy. Cayl looked up. He saw a man's head bob up above the trench wall not six feet away. As he

looked, two more heads appeared behind it, and then a fourth and fifth head. But since the embankment covered the prone figures, Cayl saw only the heads and not the bodies, and was reminded of objects in a shooting gallery. He said to himself: "They must be Chinese." The heads didn't stir and Cayl remained as motionless as possible. Still on his haunches, he unpinned and flipped a grenade over the bank, the toss carrying not more than six feet. There was a loud explosion. He heard men screaming. He said: "Got 'em! Got 'em!" and felt enormously satisfied, though, so far as he knew, there was no one to hear him. He threw another grenade. Then a hand pulled at his elbow. It was his buddy, Private John Alcott. Alcott said: "I've got three grenades," and handed one to Cayl. Keeping low, they put their three grenades over the bank and heard more screaming after the bombs exploded. Then they crouched back to back, carbines in hand, facing in opposite directions along the trench line, awaiting the enemy. But there was no need to fire.

Transeau, for just one minute, stepped outside the CP bunker. He could hear the noise of fighting along the Snook trench but could see none of his men. He judged that his position was already in process of being overrun. On the other hand, he dared not leave the telephone. The supporting fires from the mortars and artillery had not yet come in. Moreover, the men on the outguards were still in full jeopardy and would not likely stay

steadfast if he quit talking and they concluded that Snook was gone. So he could do little more than take a quick look and then duck back. With his carbine, he fired several rounds down slope, then returned to the phone. Without knowing it, he had aimed the right way in the right moment.

THE enemy plan had been quite simple. The main body—between forty and fifty men—went for the big prize, charging up the left slope of Snook to get on its rear. But a smaller party—perhaps ten men or so—had come right up the nose of Snook, aiming to grab the CP bunker and polish off the garrison.

Private Freddie Sakai was not more than twenty feet from Transeau, guarding the entrance to the CP passageway. He had heard a crackling noise from somewhere down the right-hand embankment. (Howell and Cayl had become engaged from the left.) Sakai leaned toward the noise. Standing not more than ten yards from him were five Chinese. Three of them sprang toward the trench. Sakai emptied his carbine into them. A fourth jumped on top of the CP bunker, firing a burp gun at Sakai, range five yards. Sakai dodged to one side, then hugged the sandbag wall of the bunker, reloaded, stepped back into the open, and fired upward. Though he saw the gunner go down, he felt certain that he had missed him. But it was impossible to put a grazing fire over the bunker roof. The fifth Chinese was still standing uncertainly outside the trench; Sakai fired and the man dropped. That ended his action. He said later: "It was too bad; I didn't get a chance to do any real fighting."

Private George Sakasegawa was at the upper entrance to hold the fort if the enemy got into the commo trench. It bothered him that no one came to tell him what the burp-gun fire from the valley meant. About five minutes passed. Sakasegawa had been straining to catch any sign of movement down the commo trench. Quite suddenly he looked over his left shoulder toward the rampart. Six Chinese stood on the earth bank directly above his head, gazing down at him. From behind Sakasegawa someone (it was probably Transeau) opened fire with a carbine. The sound animated Sakasegawa. He cut loose with his M1, firing three clips in less than one minute. He thought he saw three of the six

Chinese fall to his fire, but in his excitement he could not be sure. The others ducked out of sight down slope. Sakasegawa leaned over the trench wall and fired a fourth clip. He heard voices and decided the enemy was trying to move around to enter the commo trench farther up the finger. Rifle resting on the parapet, he leaned far over. But beyond twenty feet he could see nothing because an earth hummock masked the lower slope. Close at hand he could hear burp guns clattering and grenades popping. But he could not tell the direction of the sounds.

Sakasegawa waited for about five minutes, fearful that if he fired more, he would run out of ammunition. Then two grenades thumped on the earth bank within a few feet of his head, rebounded down the slope and exploded; that meant that the Chinese grenadiers were not more than ten yards below him. Private Andy Amadelo joined Sakasegawa. Another grenade came in, landed right next to Amadelo's feet, and exploding, spent its force in air, not even scratching him. He said to Sakasegawa: "I think we better give them something." So both men grenaded the outer sides of the trench wall up slope, throwing four bombs apiece. They saw no positive sign that the Chinese were moving in that direction. But that was their open flank and the point of main danger. The grenading was just a precaution. They heard nothing more of the enemy.

PRVATES Gardner and Bee, who had been bounced hard out of Outguard No. 15, blocked by the advance of the enemy main body and diverted toward the company hill, didn't get very far. Unintentionally, they collided with the enemy group which was recoiling from Sakasegawa's fire. There were about twelve Chinese. Gardner and Bee tried to run on. Several potato mashers exploded at their heels. As the steel bit into their legs, they stumbled and fell. Gardner yelled: "Throw!" They jumped up and grenaded back, each man throwing twice. In the action they became split. For a time they hid in the grass. They were not certain they had hit any Chinese, but they had seen the group scatter and run. After the field was clear, they separately found their way back to the Snook CP.

Apart from the action by Gardner and Bee and the killing of the three men on No. 14, the outguards did not

get into the fire fight. They sat steady with weapons ready, awaiting the chance to use them effectively. The chance never came.

Sakai continued to worry about the enemy gunner he had seen and attempted to wing atop the CP roof. The man had disappeared into shadow, and Sakai, who is a very small soldier, couldn't sight across the rooftop. Transeau again emerged from the bunker. The Chinese rose out of the sandbags, fired once with the burp gun, and hit Transeau in the shoulder. Then he jumped clear and was lost in the darkness before Sakai could fire.

That was the lost shot in the infighting.

Transeau returned to his phone to tell Acuff: "Sir, I think we've got it made. We've been going for twenty minutes and I haven't yet heard one yell from my crew." He had not had time to check the squad. He was playing it by ear. But the guess was right.

THE fight had started at 2304. At 2327 the Chinese attackers put up two red flares over Snook. It must have been a distress signal, since they made no further effort to close on the garrison.

Acuff meanwhile had put his supporting fires along the flanks of the finger and on the valley floor ahead of Snook. It was a gradual crescendo, begun in the first three minutes by two quad .50s, joined later by one platoon of 4.2 mortars, four 60mm mortars, and one battery of 105s. When the two Chinese flares were fired, Acuff called for "Flash Snook" and within one minute the curtain of fire closed around the front of the knob. That interdicted the escape route and provided just enough light to put a glow over the finish. One large group of the enemy was seen by Transeau as it attempted a getaway; in mid-flight, it was hit by a salvo of 4.2 shells, and when the smoke cleared, no sign of life remained.

At 2400 two answering flares were fired from the Chinese hill named Pok-kae. If it was a signal to withdraw, it was already too late. Those for whom the signal was intended were already either destroyed or in full flight, due to the more or less random efforts of seven willing American riflemen.

Transeau sat down to make his final accounting, totaling his wins and losses before reporting to Acuff. His book-keeping completed, he called for first aid.

To stifle the lush weeds of bureaucratic irresponsibility

COMMAND DEVELOPMENT

A YEAR AGO, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, became the first troop installation to be placed on the integrated programming, budgeting and accounting system. By 1 October 1956 all Class I installations in CONUS will be operating under this new business arrangement which has been given the name of Army Command Management System (ACMS). With the gradual integration of consumer funding the days of the free issue Army are ending.

Those who are directing and assisting in the establishment of the ACMS are confident that it will permit broad decentralization of responsibility and authority to installation commanders. Already the Department of the Army has been able to develop its operations so that they can be delegated to selected command managers. Functional missions are being assigned to installation commanders with specific program objectives which they can accurately cost, intelligently supervise and effectively control. The allocation of funds through channels to the installation under the new system creates a flexibility which our commanders have never before enjoyed. They may now on their own initiative purchase paint or hire a stenographer. Thus the budget has become a decision-forcing instrument. These are significant changes. Now a commander can make management decisions based on business information.

Nevertheless, at this critical time it is appropriate that we consider carefully the words of Brigadier General Robert E. Wood of Sears, Roebuck & Com-

The Commandant of the Army's Command

Management School lists eleven necessary conditions for the success of the new ACMSystem

COLONEL FRANK KOWALSKI, JR.



pany: "While systems are important, our main reliance must always be put on men rather than systems. If we devise too elaborate a system of checks and balances it will be only a matter of time before the self-reliance and initiative of our managers will be destroyed and our organization will gradually be converted into a bureaucracy." (General Wood of course here uses bureaucracy as being synonymous with red

tape and obstructionism. A realistic appraisal of our political and industrial life, however, indicates that bureaucracy—that is, hierarchical officialdom—is an intrinsic and characteristic element of our way of life. Large organizations, whether social or military, require this kind of official and disinterested governmental service. How to keep bureaucracy "responsible" is the real problem.)



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THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION

As we watch the control regulations grow on our shelves, and the paper mills grind out their endless directives, we are justified in raising a precautionary note. The Army must never become a bureaucracy. There is no disagreement on this point, but how do we safeguard initiative and self-reliance?

THE greatest insurance against "irresponsible" bureaucracy is decentralization. One is the antithesis of the other. It is not enough, however, to design a system that will permit decentralization, for men make the system what it is. If men stifle one another's initiative we can have no true decentralization. Suspicion and lack of confidence lead to centralized restrictive controls. Therefore it is important that men understand the meaning of decentralization and be constantly on the alert to keep the essential bureaucratic structure responsible. With this in mind I propose eleven conditions which will encourage command development through decentralization in our army.

Clear lines

WE MUST ESTABLISH CLEAR LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. This would seem to be axiomatic. But too often there are troublesome gray areas of ambiguity in our operations. Too many times, though responsibility is clearly assigned, authority is so circumscribed with controls and restrictions that a commander cannot carry out assigned objectives. Clearly the commander in whom responsibility is fixed is accountable to his superior for the total responsibility announced or inherent in the mission assigned to him. This responsibility cannot be delegated or passed on to a subordinate. In the clear and unmistakable words of FM 101-1: "A commander is responsible for everything that his unit does or fails to do."

The fixing of responsibility in a commander should be accompanied by sufficient delegation of authority to enable the commander to discharge his

total responsibility. The most important elements of authority are the right of command and the right to make decisions—two rights basic in decentralization. The nature and amount of authority delegated will have to be determined by the scope of the decisions that must be made to accomplish the objectives. On the other hand, a commander cannot be held accountable for a greater obligation than the responsibility assigned and authority delegated to him.


The impetus for policing command lines and eliminating areas of confusion must come from the top. It is not enough to sight down the typed or penciled lines that lead from one block to another on an organization chart. These often appear clear and pure. Difficulties and ambiguities exist in the hidden informal organization structure, obsolete operational arrangements, restrictive directives and overzealous inspectors. Typically there are too many staff officers making decisions, usurping command prerogatives and interfering with subordinate leaders. Similarly, the "corps concept" which tends to generate strong branch feelings and obligations, encourages the growth of bureaucratic controls which completely bypass command channels. To assure effective decentralization, senior echelons must continuously police our lines

of responsibility, authority and accountability to eliminate these obstructions.

Attitudes of confidence

WE MUST ENCOURAGE TRUST AND APPROVAL OF OUR COMMANDERS. This is a matter of nationwide concern. Our citizens, Congress and the Executive Department must believe and have confidence in the integrity and ability of our military leaders to manage the Army efficiently and effectively. This calls for a convincing job of public education and orientation.

Within the Army structure, self-reliance and initiative are determined by the attitude that prevails at higher headquarters. Both are undermined if commanders are subjected to the searching scrutiny of endless visits of staff officers. There can be no decentralization without confidence that associates and subordinates have the capacity to make sound and honest decisions. This trust in subordinates must be stimulated throughout the Army and must be practiced by commanders, staffs, and services at all levels. This means that we must recapture our belief in the integrity of officers and also be prepared to eliminate those who do not live up to the trust put in them. The more confidence higher headquarters has in the capability of subordinate echelons, the more effectively will the




subordinate leaders rise to the challenge of their responsibilities. The acid test of managerial or command decentralization is the degree to which commanders are permitted to participate in decision-making.

Results count

THE COMMANDER SHOULD BE JUDGED BY THE RESULTS HE PRODUCES. This is a universally accepted principle in business and one that is ruthlessly applied in battle. Unfortunately, in nontactical operations, results are not so clearly apparent as under business or battle situations. Consequently there is a tendency to conduct too many staff visits and inspections and require too many reports. In too many instances these surveys do not determine what has been accomplished but how the job is being carried out. Present surveys are usually vertical rather than horizontal reviews. For example, manpower surveys examine and review *how* the commander utilizes his personnel, not *what* he accomplishes with them. In these surveys no consideration is given to the horizontal dollar or economy effect. Similarly, too often auditors investigate the discretionary powers of commanders instead of reporting on legal sufficiency and correctness of accounts.

A new orientation is necessary which will encourage examination of activities to determine the degree of accomplishment. The Army Command Management System permits such an evaluation. Under this system missions are subdivided into objectives. Programs for these objectives and their cost are set up by the installation. The programs and budget are then reviewed by higher headquarters and if approved the installation is given funds if available.



If the installation commander is given adequate authority to spend these funds it should be sufficient to measure the results he accomplishes without surveying details of his operation.

Initiative at the point of action

THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE A DECISION SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO THE COMMANDER NEAREST THE POINT WHERE THE ACTION TAKES PLACE. This is necessary if for no other reason than command development of our leaders. The organization and management of our peacetime Army must be geared to the requirements of war. We must give our leaders an opportunity to think as they will be required to act in a nuclear war. In such a struggle it is obvious that concentrations will be held to a minimum. This means fragmentation of organizations, separation and division of forces into a large number of self-energized and semi-independent units. Commanders will be called upon to show more initiative and independent action than they ever have had to demonstrate in the past.

In my opinion, initiative can be developed in many and feeds on itself. The greater number of decisions that can be made at the lower management or command levels in peacetime the more effective will be our leaders in war. The more checks there are on decision-making the less opportunity leaders have for independent action. If commanders have to consult higher headquarters before they can make a decision, there is no decentralization. And so, the fewer people that have to be consulted and the lower they are in command structure the greater is the opportunity for command development. Accordingly, we must encourage decisions to be made at the lowest operating level possible.

Severing the cord of control

THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO A

COMMANDER VESTS IN THAT COMMANDER THE POWER TO DECIDE AND TO ACT. This power cannot be delegated and at the same time retained by a superior. It is not possible to decentralize operations, and at the same time retain functions at higher echelons. The commander accountable for the execution of a mission has the right to decide what has to be done and how to do it. Higher headquarters must refrain from interfering in the details of operation.

To do is to learn

DECENTRALIZATION REQUIRES AN UNDERSTANDING THAT TO ERR IS HUMAN AND THAT MISTAKES WILL BE MADE. Since we cannot train leaders without permitting subordinates the opportunity to make decisions, we can expect mistakes to be made. A price must be paid for this development of command, a price in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and a price in terms of dollars. This does not mean, however, that we should tolerate indolence, inefficiency, or stupidity. It does mean that the senior must permit the subordinate an opportunity to exercise his initiative and judgment. More significantly it means that the senior must not be damned for this tolerance in operations. Boss Kettering once said, "No one can stumble if he is sitting."

It may well be that the more we decentralize our operations the more mistakes we will make. It is a well-established fact, however, that the mistakes at lower echelons in a decentralized organization are not so costly as those made at the top in a centralized system. For when a mistake is made by top management it is usually a whopper! Furthermore, the sum total of all the individual sound decisions will be more valuable to the Army than centrally issued dicta.

No silk purses from sows' ears

WHEN A MISSION IS ASSIGNED, RE-

SPONSIBILITY FIXED AND AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO A COMMANDER, IT IS THE OBLIGATION OF THE SENIOR HEADQUARTERS TO PROVIDE THE MEN, MONEY AND MATERIAL NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE COMMANDER TO ACCOMPLISH HIS MISSION. This objective necessitates a complete reorientation of basic thinking. Too often commanders faced with serious shortages in men, money and materials have been directed to get the job done. This is a commendable military approach, but it does not necessarily accomplish results.

Successive commanders in the chain of command must provide adequate resources to lower units in terms of mission. If these resources are not provided, subordinate commanders must be permitted to make objective appraisals and frank presentations of business situations to higher headquarters. Furthermore, they must be brought in early to assist in the planning of programs. Senior headquarters must be prepared to provide the necessary resources which the commander needs to accomplish his mission or accept the responsibility for ineffectiveness or failure. A studied and deliberate effort must be made at top command levels to insure maximum stability of missions, fund allocations and personnel assignments. If missions must be changed, adjustments must be made in men, money and material to satisfy the new obligations.

Hire and fire

THE COMMANDER MUST BE AUTHORIZED THE SAME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL THAT HE IS NOW BEING PERMITTED WITH FUNDS. If the full benefits of the Army Command Management System are to be realized in nontactical operations, the commander must be given the power to decide how he will use his subordinates and must have the right to accept or reject (for cause) individuals offered to him. If we are to have a decentralized business operation, there can be no meaning to spaces and bodies. There can only be funds, job requirements and people to do the jobs within the funds. If the Army is to be big business, then in nontactical activities we must act like big business. If we are to cost operations, the cost must be realistic and complete and must include military as well as civilian pay. If the pay of individuals, military and civilian, is to be charged against the funds of a commander, he must be

given the authority to select, to accept or reject (for cause), and to fire either military or civilian personnel.

It is interesting to note that at Fort Jackson the Budget Execution Plan for Fiscal Year 1956 estimated \$20.5 million to cover the cost of military pay and allowances for military personnel required to operate the installation, whereas only \$17 million was actually funded for all other post expenses including civilian personnel pay. The \$20.5 million, of course, was not funded to the installation, and the commander had no control over this expenditure. This is not a realistic business arrangement. If we are to have management through the cost of operations budget, there can be no place in the system for management through numbers.

The commander should not be required to accept an ineffectual officer, soldier, or civilian, and he should have the power to release surpluses or ineffectives. This admittedly is a radical approach to personnel management. And so it may be necessary, because of the peculiarities of military recruitment and service, to permit some adjustments in military personnel accounting. If, for example, a commander is required by higher headquarters to utilize an ineffective officer or soldier, then the unwanted individual should be issued free to the activity. As a principle, if we are to hold the commander accountable for results under the Army Command Management System, we must eliminate spaces, discard the philosophy of bodies and gear personnel utilization to fund limitations and job requirements.


The product can't be cheapened

STANDARDS OF TRAINING, PROCUREMENT AND MAINTENANCE MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO INSURE AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. This is most important, because the cost consciousness developed under the ACMS may serve to encourage reduction of stock levels, deferment of maintenance and minimizing of performance standards. The initial reduction of surpluses which the ACMS has generated has been most beneficial. Continued fund limitations may cause depletion of essential inventories to dangerous lows. In a nuclear war this could be disastrous. Similarly, inadequate consumer funds may force commanders to sacrifice maintenance of facilities and equipment. Trucks,

tanks and even weapons may be declined to conserve funds. In these extreme conditions, training will suffer and the effectiveness of combat and service elements be reduced. The deterrents against this deterioration are high performance standards centrally prescribed. If we demand high training standards, the commander will be forced to use his funds and give his attention to training. If we require that a high percentage of weapons and vehicles be operative, the commander will shift funds from less urgent areas to maintenance of weapons and vehicles. If funds are not available for these shifts, the ACMS will rapidly disclose this situation. Most important, responsibility for failure to carry out approved programs can be laid at the proper command echelon.

Wanted, a standard of comparison

A NEW CONCEPT OF CONTROL MUST BE DEVELOPED WHICH WILL ELIMINATE THE CURRENT RESTRICTIVE REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES. In this connection controls may take many forms. In industry the most effective control for top management is the profit and loss statement. Though efforts have been made we have found no acceptable substitute for this simple and effective measure of results. It is impossible to evaluate the intangibles in military programs. And so the trend has been to control operations through restrictive directives and regulations. Prescribing what the commander must do and what he is not permitted to do, usurps the commander's power of decision.



THE Commanding General, Continental Army Command, has taken a leading position in this new philosophy by maintaining that the basic reason for the existence of his headquarters is to provide service to the units in the field. He looks upon the continental army commanders as his deputies. As a principle, the CONARC staff disseminates information and announces guide lines. The implementation of approved programs is left to the initiative of responsible field commanders. This concept might be described as centralization of guide lines and decentralization of implementation. As a first step in generating a "can do" and permissive attitude, the top command echelons of the Army must search out and eliminate restrictive regulations. Fertile fields for this exercise can be found in technical services directives and personnel management policies.

\$s aren't the yardstick

MOST IMPORTANT, ALL MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE DOLLAR IS NOT A MEASURE OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. A business organization can decentralize with confidence, because it can readily measure its effectiveness and that of its subordinate elements through an examination of its profit-and-loss statement. The dollar is a universal yardstick in business. But what is the measure of effectiveness of a soldier, a regiment, a division? The intangibles of morale, teamwork and spirit, all so essential to a fighting force, cannot be evaluated in terms of dollars. Training inspections can tell much, maneuvers can determine more, but only in battle can the effectiveness of a fighting force be measured. At this time when there is so much emphasis on the new business tools and techniques which are being integrated into the Army, we must not be misled by the dollar sign. It is no criterion for comparing the worth of one unit against another. Nor can we compare our forces with those of an enemy on the basis of dollars expended.


In conclusion, it must always be remembered that the commander guides the future rather than submitting to it. He cannot surrender to or become the slave of any system. On the contrary, he must master that system, overcome difficulties, envision improvements and produce results. Lack of resources may cause him to curtail operations, but this should be a programmed action. He can never abdicate to frustration, for he alone must get things done.



A promising newcomer is Sgt. John F. Mooney of Sixth Army, who won the new shooter's trophy in the All-Army matches.



World champion pistol shot, MSgt. Huelet L. "Joe" Benner (right) and Lt. Col. W. A. Hancock placed first and third respectively in aggregate score in this year's All-Army Rifle & Pistol matches.



Two young shooters who promise to keep the Army's shooting banners flying high for years to come. Lt. David Miller (left) finished second to Sgt. Benner in aggregate score in the All-Army championship. Lt. David C. Cartes is another marksman to watch.



Two All-Army champions. Maj. Carl W. Byas (*left*) won the title in 1954 and Capt. John H. Asbury in 1956.

ALL-ARMY MARKSMEN

Here are some old pros, veterans of many a championship match, and young hopefuls, squeezing for a place in the sun—and maybe on the U. S. Olympic team—who are representing the Army at this year's National Matches



A new member, SP2 J. O. Kleinnan set a record during this year's All-Army championships.



CWO Robert F. Schroeder is a veteran of many matches

Maj. Lloyd C. Hummert consistently scores high



Sgt. Benner and Sgt. William B. Blankenship, Jr., of First Army.



Maj. B. C. Curtis (*right*) is the only man in active competition to win the National Trophy Individual Pistol Championship twice. With him is CWO Oscar K. Weinmeister.

7,000 New Regulars

Here is the Army's plan for the Regular Officer Augmentation Act of 1956

SOME 7,250 of 40,000 eligible non-regular officers now on active duty will be commissioned into the Regular Army in the next two years. An additional number, perhaps 5,000, will be integrated by 1963.

These figures are estimates by the Indians in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel who are working out details of the Regular Officer Augmentation Act passed by the last Congress and signed by the President.

Important note to eligible officers: You must seek appointment by submitting an application. The Army will not issue you a formal invitation or solicit your application.

A Department of the Army circular giving detailed information is being published. Application forms will also be available. These will be given wide distribution at an early date. You should watch for the announcement by your command.

It is expected that applications will be accepted during the four-month period from 1 October 1956 to 31 January 1957.

The new law is the first comprehensive Regular Army officer procurement legislation since the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and provides, for the first time since the 1946-47 integration, authority for appointment of Regular Army officers above the permanent grade of first lieutenant.

Here is how the law will affect the Army:

The Army's statutory authorization for Regular male and WAC commissioned officers is increased from 30,600 to 49,500. This ceiling does not include the Army Nurse Corps, the Army Medical Specialist Corps, or the professors at West Point, and no provision of the act applies to them. The

only effect of the act on medical and dental officers is the total increase in authorization.

The present Regular Army officer strength is about 27,000; two years from now, when integration begins, it will be 1,350 more, or 28,350.

The Secretary of Defense and the President set these goals for the Army: ¶ 72 per cent of statutory authorization, or about 35,640, by July 1958. ¶ 80 per cent of authorization, or 39,600, by 1963.

These objectives are based upon estimates of the rate at which well-qualified officers can be selected and appointed while at the same time creating and maintaining a balanced officer corps, without pronounced "humps."

Here, in general, are the ground rules to be followed in selecting officers for appointment.

Appointments may be made in any grade. But the Army plans to appoint only in grades below general officer. As a matter of fact, the way the law is written no officer could qualify for original appointment above the permanent grade of colonel.

Any officer appointed under this law must be able to complete twenty years of active commissioned service before his fifty-fifth birthday. This may include periods of service both before and after appointment.

The maximum age for appointment with no promotion list credit is twenty-seven (this doesn't apply to veterinarians, chaplains, JAGs and MSCs who continue under previous laws and policies). This "base" age of twenty-seven may be increased by the amount of promotion list service credited at appointment.

For purposes of determining grade, promotion-list position, seniority in permanent grade, and permanent promo-

tion eligibility, an appointee may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, be credited with his active commissioned Army service after 6 December 1941 and since his twenty-first birthday, plus not more than one of three types of constructive credit.

If an appointee receives constructive credit, his total credit may not exceed the amount by which his age exceeds twenty-seven. This requirement represents the intent of the Congress as manifested in the hearings. Since the maximum age at appointment of twenty-seven may only be increased by the amount of credit granted, it is obvious that if an appointee receives constructive credit his total credit must exactly equal his age minus twenty-seven.

The first constructive credit provision allows a commissioned officer on active duty on the effective date of the Act to receive credit for a period, not to exceed eight years, equal to the amount by which his commissioned service creditable for basic pay exceeds his active commissioned service.

For example, an applicant, forty years old at appointment, was on active duty on 20 July 1956, the effective date of the Act. He has ten years of active commissioned service and five years additional service as a Reserve officer not on active duty. He could be credited with ten plus five, or fifteen years, were it not for the fact that this exceeds his age minus twenty-seven; since this is the case, he will be credited with only forty minus twenty-seven, or thirteen years.

The second constructive credit provision permits granting of up to eight years of such credit to not more than two hundred outstanding specialists in critical fields in accordance with criteria prescribed by the Secretary of the Army and approved by the President.

CHART NO. 1—OFFICER DISTRIBUTION BEFORE AUGMENTATION (JULY 1958)

This chart which pictures the distribution of officer strength (omitting those non-Regulars who are ineligible for augmentation) indicates years of completed promotion-list service (horizontal scale) and the number of officers in each year group (vertical scale). The "obligated tour" officers are not included in the estimated 40,000 officers eligible for RA commissions. Most of these are ROTC and OCS graduates, and drafted medical and dental officers and are eligible for RA appointment under other programs. Of special interest are the hump at 16 years' service and the valley in the 11th year. Officers in the hump area who qualify on the basis of active commissioned service will be offered appointments with up to two years' less service credit than the maximum in order to increase selectivity in these lesser years and to fill in the valley.






CHART NO. 2—DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS WHO WILL BE AUGMENTED



This chart shows the distribution pattern of the 7,250 officers who will be selected for RA appointment by July 1958. The 39,600 line is the manning level approved by the President. The plan, based upon an optimum distribution of the 39,600, takes into account normal and promotional attrition as well as other factors and represents the distribution which would result if a constant annual input were maintained at the bottom of the structure and only at the bottom for 30 years or more.

CHART NO. 3—REGULAR ARMY OFFICER STRUCTURE IN 1963

This chart shows how the officers of the Regular Army will be distributed in 1963 when the 39,600 objective has been reached. The hump will have partially absorbed by the increased ceiling and by normal attrition. The void at the far left compensates for it and allows continuation of annual procurement of junior officers.



Such specialists must be appointed within two years after the effective date of this Act. Their names, grades and justification for their appointment must be submitted to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate by 15 July 1958.

It is the intent of Congress that this provision provide the Army a means to obtain such highly qualified individuals as nuclear physicists, electronics experts and similar scientific personnel. The criteria for their eligibility and the method of selection are being announced by the Department of the Army in a special circular.

The third constructive credit provision allows not more than two years of such credit to be given to appointees who do not qualify under either of the other provisions.

Here are two examples of how this will work.

Lt. Col. A, forty years old at appointment, has twelve years of active commissioned service. He could be credited with twelve plus two, or fourteen years, were it not for the fact that this exceeds his age minus twenty-seven; as it is, he will receive credit for only forty minus twenty-seven, or thirteen years.

Lt. Col. B, forty years old at appointment, has ten years of active commissioned service. He could be credited with ten plus two, or twelve years, but his age at appointment may not exceed twenty-seven plus his promotion-list credit, or thirty-nine years. This makes him ineligible.

In the promotion lists published in the Army Register, a "basic date" is shown for each Regular officer. The subtraction of this date from the current date gives the officer's service credit for promotion purposes. For new appointees under the 1956 Augmentation Act the basic date of an officer who receives credit only for active commissioned service must fall between his

twenty-first and twenty-seventh birthday; for an officer who receives any constructive credit, it must be his twenty-seventh birthday.

The first step to be taken in the augmentation is an increase in the annual intake of junior officers. This has already begun and chiefly involves distinguished military graduates of ROTC and junior officers on active duty. It is possible that future legislation may increase the capacity of the Military Academy.

The charts and accompanying text describe how the initial augmentation of some 7000 officers will be effected.

Each man selected will be placed on the promotion list after, and be given the same permanent grade as, the most junior officer already on the list who has the same or greater service credit and who has not been passed over for permanent promotion. If he is on active duty when appointed, his temporary grade will not be changed; if he enters the Regular Army from non-active-duty status, his temporary grade and date of rank will be determined in the same manner as if he were being called to active duty as a Reserve officer.

A commitment made to Congress during the hearings was that any applicant who earlier competed in a competitive tour will, if selected under this program, be given a grade and date of rank junior to that of any Regular Army officer who competed with him successfully in the same program or tour in which he failed of selection.

Furthermore, with the exception of the two hundred highly qualified technical specialists, no officer will be appointed in a permanent grade higher than the highest in which he has served satisfactorily on active duty. These restrictions, together with the increased ceiling, will safeguard adequately the interest of Regular officers already in the Army.

Among the concepts on which the selection plan is based are the following:

Boards of mature officers working under the supervision of the Chief of the Career Management Division, TAGO, will make the selections. The data available to them will consist chiefly of the candidates' 201 files; for applicants not on active duty and those who have limited service, additional selection aids, such as scores on biographical information blanks and interview-board reports, will be furnished.

All appointees must be fully qualified to be Regular officers; from among those fully qualified the best qualified will be selected to meet the Army's requirements.

The man must seek an appointment; it is up to his initiative.

As presently planned the schedule of augmentation of the 7,000 will be about as follows:

October 1956-January 1957—Applications will be submitted as provided by the Army circular now being distributed.

November 1956-April 1957—Processing of applications by major commands and The Adjutant General.

January-October 1957—Action by two groups of selection boards. One will select fully qualified applicants from the total number submitted and the second group will make the final selections.

November 1957-May 1958—Necessary investigations, physical examinations, record-keeping and preparation of nominations for Secretary of Army, Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Senate; also preparation of appointments and the publication of D/A orders.

Most appointments will be made in June and July 1958. A limited number may be made as early as the summer of 1957.

NATO's Shield

The brilliant general who is to command SHAPE, faces up to the fact that Western Europe cannot be defended without adequate ground armies

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, Rtd.



ON the slight shoulders of the graying American Air Force General, Lauris Norstad, who is to succeed Gruenther in the supreme allied command, rests the problem of finding the new rationale and the new inspiration to keep the allied military effort going. Norstad's task is much more difficult than that faced by General Eisenhower when he assumed command of the nonexistent NATO forces.

General Eisenhower had world-wide prestige. Heads of state humbly accepted his suggestions about the military effort required and did their best within their internal political systems to meet his demands.

His leadership was reinforced by the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union at that time. The danger was obvious to everyone. But Norstad is faced with maintaining and increasing the NATO military establishment at a time when the same European people no longer can see any danger coming from the Soviet Union.

Norstad is without any doubt the most brilliant senior officer wearing the American uniform. He has been a military prodigy throughout his career, reaching high rank when very young and looking with his blond slimness younger than he was. His sheer intellectual brilliance won the respect of the older Army and Navy planners with whom he was associated in the Pentagon during World War II. No one who worked with him failed to respect and admire him.

Added to his intellectual brilliance was a quietness in presenting his position, a calmness that never aroused the animosity and resistance of his colleagues as he convinced them of the validity of what seemed to them his radical ideas. At Supreme Allied Headquarters where he is now air deputy to Gruenther, he has been the major educational influence. He has slowly, calmly and by force of reason, without arousing resistance, convinced Gruenther, Gruenther's Chief-of-Staff Gen. Courtland Van Rensselaer Schuyler and Gruenther's deputy commander, the stiff but brilliant Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, of the validity of the U.S. air nuclear strategy.

The adoption by SHAPE in 1954 of a forward strategy based on atomic weapons is due to the never-pressing never-excited logic of Norstad.

THE military side of NATO now is facing a crisis. The allied forces of West Central Europe can become a shell, not even a plate glass window—under the impact of new Soviet policies—that will provide no deterrence and no defense for Europe. It will soon be the responsibility of

Norstad—and he has no such prestige as Eisenhower outside military circles—to halt the growing dissolution of NATO military power.

Although an advocate of the air atomic deterrent strategy, Norstad also makes the most lucid case the writer has heard for sufficient ground forces in Western Europe to provide a shield against a Soviet surprise attack and a shield of sufficient strength to save Western Germany and Europe from being overrun before the retaliatory counter-offensive takes effect.

* * *

According to Norstad, a strategic air planner, the deterrent strategy is no deterrent unless an adequate ground force is ready on the West's frontiers. The ground force shield, Norstad declares, is an essential part of the deterrent strategy, just as important as the air nuclear retaliatory force.

His argument is that without a sufficient shield of ground forces the Russians could overrun most of Western Germany in 24 hours by a surprise move, or they could work up some justification for moving into Western Germany, such as riots endangering the peace, and present the West with a *fait accompli*. The West would then be faced with the decision to resort to all-out nuclear war or to accept the Soviet advance.

THIS today is considered in SHAPE the most dangerous possibility the West faces. Soviet forces, even after they are reduced, still will be ample for such an operation. In other words, a purely retaliatory air nuclear strategy founded on peripheral bases could turn out to have no deterrence at all.

How strong should the shield be? About 30 divisions is considered close to both the maximum needed and the minimum required. It could vary 10 or 15 per cent either way, but not much more.

The reasons for this figure are complex and involve geographical force and readiness studies too complicated to go into. Gruenther and Norstad believe the requirements for the ground force shield can be met, that they are within the practical capabilities of the Western powers; but if they are to be met, the full German contribution is essential. The British and Americans cannot withdraw any divisions, the Belgians and the Dutch must maintain their contribution and the French must restore as soon as possible the forces they have pledged to NATO. Otherwise the deterrent strategy will be without effect.

THE problem that Norstad faces is political and not military. He must convince the NATO powers that the air nuclear deterrent strategy by itself is no deterrent without the irreducible minimum of ground forces on the frontier.

Norstad has to overcome the universal desire to reduce taxes and military service. He has to convince all of our European allies that adequate ground forces for a shield that can prevent a surprise march over Western Europe and hold until the air nuclear retaliatory attack becomes effective are as essential as American air nuclear power for their defense. He has to turn back the idea that there is an easy and painless military solution to the defense of Europe.

If he succeeds, it will be more of a miracle than Eisenhower accomplished when he put the NATO military show on the road and made a reality of the allied forces of Europe.

From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 July 1956

CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND



Lt. Gen.
RIDGELY GAITHER
Dep. for Res. Comp.

Special Staff



Col.
R. W. MUTH
Chem. Off.



Col.
D. P. GIBBS
Signal Off.



Col.
J. C. STEWART
Info. Off.



Col.
J. J. LANE
Transp. Off.



Col.
L. W. EVANS
Chaplain



Col.
T. W. COOKE
Ord. Off.



Col.
J. D. BELL
QM



Lt. Col.
J. L. CRAWLEY
Chief, Fin. & Acct.



Col.
J. L. CRAWFORD
Surgeon



Col.
C. Z. SHUGART
AG



Col.
D. A. PHELAN
Engineer



COL.
E. L. ANDRICK
Prov. Marshal

Combat Arms



Maj. Gen.
A. D. MEAD
Chief, Inf. Sec.



Col.
N. I. FOOKS
Exec., Inf. Sec.



Maj. Gen.
L. L. DOAN
Chief, Armor Sec.



Col.
C. B. EWING
Exec., Armor Sec.



Maj. Gen.
J. B. MURPHY
Chief, Arty. Sec.



Col.
T. J. COUNIHAN
Exec., Arty. Sec.

ARMY magazine
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9 AUGUST 1956



Lt. Gen.
E. T. WILLIAMS
Deputy CG & Dir.
Combat Dev.

Combat Developments



Col.
H. K. WHALEN
Dep. Dir., Combat
Dev.



Brig. Gen.
D. E. BEACH
Dir., Sp. Wpns. Dev.
(Fort Bliss)

General Staff



Col.
G. E. FLETCHER
G1



Col.
N. W. BALTZER
Dep. G1



Col.
R. P. HAGEN
Acting G2



COL.
C. A. WEAVER
Dep. G2



Maj. Gen.
O. P. NEWMAN
G3



Brig. Gen.
D. S. CAIRNS
Deputy G3



Brig. Gen.
T. H. SANFORD
G4



Col.
E. C. ORTH
Dep. G4

Material Development



Maj. Gen.
R. M. OSBORNE
Dir.



Col.
C. W. McCONNELL
Dep. Dir.

Washington Liaison



Col.
L. W. BYERS

CONARC Boards



Col.
F. C. PAUL
Pres., Bd. No. 5



Col.
J. H. KOCHAVAR
Pres., Bd. No. 4



Col.
P. F. HOOVER
Dir., Arctic Test Ctr.
(Fort Greely)



Col.
E. G. SHINKLE
Pres., Bd. No. 1



Col.
J. C. WELBORN
Pres., Bd. No. 2



Col.
R. R. WILLIAMS
Pres., Bd. No. 6



Col.
HENRY NEILSON
Actg. Pres., Bd. No. 3

*Give the embattled PIO support without interference and he'll
win the campaign on the Army's news front,
says this successful public information officer
who holds the heretical view that a PIO is not a staff
officer but a commander directing action from a news CP*

The Army's Press Relations

COLONEL GEORGE PATRICK WELCH

ALMOST everyone in the Army is an expert on Army public relations and knows exactly how the other fellow should conduct it. He wants no part of it himself but he is quite sure that Army public relations are generally surrounded by the aroma of an aroused skunk. Ask him why he is so sure, and he will cite some news story of vaguely recent date in which the Army was unfavorably portrayed.

It would make no difference if the facts recounted in the story were true. If it is unfavorable to the Army, Army public relations must necessarily be at fault.

But ask the same officer if he has ever considered seeking a tour of duty in public information and he will recoil in horror. Rightly or wrongly, many of our best officers consider identification, even for a single assignment, with Army PI the graveyard of their career. There is evidence that supports this view.

This general attitude spells out one of Army public relations' first difficul-

ties. Actually, the fundamentals of sound public relations, as now widely understood and practiced in industry and by civilian institutions, simply are not a part of an Army officer's training.

Perhaps it is desirable to answer the query so often raised in the Congress, and indeed in certain portions of our national press: Why does the Army, or any Government institution, require public relations at all?

Well, for the Army, the answer is simple. The Army is the country's biggest business. It makes heavy demands on the public, not only in money, but in manpower. It touches both the pocketbook and the son approaching manhood. These are highly emotional areas.

In addition, we have some forty million veterans, ambulant on our thorny road to world leadership. Their memory of service remains vivid, increasing in nostalgia with the years. They want to know what is going on in the new Army and, like the Roman legionary, are unwilling to believe their successors share their valor, or can endure their memoried hardships.

The interest of the public in the doings of the Army is mirrored in our enormous network of news media. The daily press, the radio, the television, magazines, books, and other media, including the moving-picture industry, in spite of internal competition, are all united in support of the firm American belief that the business of Government is the business of every citizen. What they want to know about the

Army, the Army had better be ready to tell them, unless it can claim and, much harder, maintain, there is national insecurity in the telling.

THIS telling, in the first instance, is the domain and duty of the public information officer. Do away with him, as has been often proposed and sometimes tried, and his duties will immediately devolve on another officer.

Out of this inexorable requirement stem the organization and responsibilities of public information—some years ago, out of respect for the sensibilities of the Congress, the name was changed from public relations.

Worked out over the years of World War II and since, there is nothing wrong with the present organization, policies and procedures of Army Public Information, as described in the 360-series of Army Regulations and in the recently revised *Handbook for Public Information Officers*. The trouble comes in the day-to-day application.

I have said few of our Army officers understand the fundamentals of sound public relations. This does not mean one cannot find a large share of agreement on what is wanted. But our Army, schooled in strict attention to the tangibles of warfare, trained to look for capabilities rather than intentions of the enemy, rigorously held to ascertainable fact, peers suspiciously at the poor public information officer dealing with the intangibles of public opinion

Colonel George Patrick Welch, Artillery, was commissioned in the Reserve in 1923. He came on active duty in 1942 and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1947. His service included a tour as Deputy Chief of Information and Education, Department of the Army, and more recently Deputy Chief of the Florida Military District.

and advising a course which cannot be sustained by logic, or proved in advance to be sound.


We have had, of course, great commanders—and not a few juniors—electrically aware of the value of publicity. We have had others who have benefited by publicity of which at the time they knew nothing and would have deplored if given a chance.

As an example, it is now beside the point that the famous "Nuts!" of Bastogne was spoken, not by that able and modest soldier, General McAuliffe, but by a harassed press briefing officer trying to satisfy clamoring correspondents.

because the Army itself is good, and for those of us who have served it any length of time, is the most magnificent institution in America, combining to an otherwise unapproached degree integrity, devotion, great organizational ability, self-abnegation, and that undefined because undefinable combination of brains, courage, know-how and character, mellowed by experience and humility we call leadership, so amply demonstrated on a thousand fields of battle. This institution, the Army, has earned respect, and basically holds the respect, of the American people. Respect is the foundation

Army," produced originally for the orientation of new recruits, has been shown through commercial motion-picture theaters to an audience of nearly sixty million American citizens. The Army's Home Town News Center weekly processes many thousands of personal items about citizens in the Army which are, on the whole, eagerly sought by home-town newspapers.

By and large, this type of public relations—sound, informative, without bombast, but steadily exhibiting pride in the things about which we have a right to be proud—goes steadily on, tying the public and its Army together



He succeeded better than he knew and gave American military tradition a slogan comparable to the best efforts of John Paul Jones or Stephen Decatur. This may have been genius, or it might have been accident, but it is not the day-to-day stuff of sound public relations.

IN their daily efforts to explain the Army to the American people—and to our sometimes puzzled but generally awed allies—our public information people, from the Pentagon down to the smallest post, do an amazingly creditable job. By and large they can do it

of good public relations.

In furthering understanding of the Army, experienced officers working with the radio and TV, with the moving-picture companies making Army pictures, and with books and magazines, have in the last ten years done yeoman work. Rarely indeed in these media is the Army misrepresented or its ideals ridiculed. The Army's weekly TV release, "The Big Picture," has for some years brought factual reports on Army activities to a steadily growing audience now estimated at fifty million every week. The Army's superb documentary film, "This Is Your

in understanding and mutual respect.

Actually, the field in which major criticism, both within and without the Army, arises, is one part and one part only, of public-relations activity. It is, however, the part with the highest and most explosive coefficient of irritation. It is the Army's dealing with the daily press. Here on balance, I hold that it is not the newspapers or the reporters, but the Army's concept of handling the daily news, which is at fault.

A reporter works against a deadline. If he is given an Army story to get, he must get it before the edition goes to

press or it is, to his editor, worthless. This urgency is heightened by competition, but even without competition it would probably persist. Daily news is today's news, not tomorrow's or next week's. The press cannot wait, and if it is forced to wait, it can express its resentment in a mighty roar of protest, shaking commanders with its vigor. More often, it will not wait, and not having the true story from a responsible Army spokesman, prints what it can put together from other sources only reasonably slanted by its righteous wrath at the Army which hemmed and hawed even while the presses were rolling.

FROM Washington to Korea and on around the world, the reporter in pursuit of a story makes his first official contact for details, confirmation or denial, and general background, with the nearest PIO. In general, he will have most of the story already, and needs only to be assured of its essential truth and surrounding factors to wrap it up.

It is here, in important stories at least, that our Army system breaks down. Under present organizational concepts, the PIO is a staff officer, advising but not deciding. All too often he has to go to his colleagues on the staff, or to subordinate staffs for the details, and then to his commander for decision. All this takes time, and time is what the PIO rarely possesses. When the information is refused, as too often happens, or where it is given in garbled form, the delay is even greater. Getting the approval of his commander takes more time, which can range from a few minutes—if the commander is accessible—to a couple of months if it happens in the Pentagon, where a most astonishing list of persons exercise the right of censorship over the way in which the PIO performs his duties.

Actually, Army doctrine possesses, even if it does not apply, the answer to this problem which, I repeat, is the only major source of difficulty. The PIO, in his dealings with the daily press, should be considered not a staff officer, but a commander. His office is not a staff section, but a

command post responsible, under his commander's policy directives, for the conduct of action on the news front. Like any other commander, he should be let alone once he knows what is required. He will make mistakes, but expecting him not to make mistakes is like expecting an infantry commander to take an enemy position without casualties. It is the campaign that counts, not the immediate battle, and the PIO who is permitted to make his own decisions, who has been given access to all information available to the staff, who is serenely confident of his commander's confidence and support, will win the campaign.

One of the burdens constantly on the shoulders of a PIO is the burden of explaining not only his own actions, but critical stories of which he often knows nothing until he himself has read them. At the Pentagon, the daily summaries of news stories were always the first item of business, for it was a question of time only—and not much time at that—before a "hot" critical story started a call from upstairs: "Who released it?"

Generally, of course, these stories are not released at all in the normal sense of the term. The Pentagon press representatives, by and large, are responsible, experienced journalists, far more wise in the affairs of the building than most official occupants. Seldom do their stories originate with public information people. The latter's role is to confirm, deny, correct, or explain the background, after the story already exists, and will be printed, in one form or another. But somehow the general belief that if a story is printed, the PIO must have released it, holds an un-

diminished grasp on the minds of the politically sensitive "upstairs."

Here another conflict in understanding too often develops.

It should go without saying that a PIO's duty is to release all requested information about the Army which does not involve security, in an accurate, factual form, backed up with adequate background for understanding. It is, however, probably beyond the reasonably practical to expect Administration appointees who necessarily have a political point of view, not to take credit for Army achievements, or conversely, not to be irritated by criticism, even if the events involved would have occurred had the Prohibition Party won the election.

To foresee these particular areas of opinion difference requires a degree of clairvoyance given to few except the political opportunists, of which the Army, fortunately, has almost none. The result can be calamitous and the graveyard of reputation is dug, as often as not by what one group might call political naïveté, but which in other parts of the Army is a stern virtue called moral integrity.

COUPLED with the average Army officer's reluctance to get tangled in public information assignments is the accelerating dearth of qualified public information careerists. This is particularly true in the senior grades. The supply—at the best limited—is being steadily cut by attrition, and by discouragement. Most of our qualified public information specialists, for good reasons, are Reserve officers—men with prior related experience in civil life. Because there is no specialist branch

to carry these officers they are assigned to the various combat and administrative branches where they become immediately a source of difficulty. Since they want and, because of their qualifications, get repeated public information assignments, they are of little direct use to their branch. The result has too often been failure of promotion, by-passing for prized school appointments, and in some cases elimination from the service at times of



recurrent economy actions. If the Military Police, or the Adjutant General's Corps, or any branch, is required to eliminate a certain percentage of its Reserve officers, it is natural enough that it will keep good average workhorses in its own field at the expense of the able, intelligent and specialized public information people who are charged to it, but have been of no value, branch-wise.

It appears basic policy that the Chief of Information of the Department of the Army, the general officer charged with over-all responsibility for the entire public relations program, must never, at the time of his appointment, have had any prior experience in this highly specialized field. Of the several magnificent soldiers and gentlemen who have held this assignment since the end of World War II, only one stayed in it long enough to learn what it was all about, and to do constructive work in the field.

WHAT is needed is a long-term policy looking to the establishment of a specialist corps of public relations officers who will alternate tours of duty in their specialty with tours with troops in the field and at the several Army schools. Public information officers must know the Army inside out. They must, in fact, be far better informed on its organization, objectives, requirements, and policies than is demanded of an officer on more routine duties. They must exhibit qualities of tact, understanding of civilian attitudes, and ability to speak and write the English language which are getting harder and harder to find. In short, public relations duty demands the best among our officer corps.

The day may come when this concept is as accepted generally throughout the Army as are today our doctrines of command, tactics, organization, and logistics. The day may come when the Army at all vital echelons from the Department of the Army down has qualified, educated, and trained public relations officers who hold, because they have earned it, the respect of their fellows, the confidence of properly skeptical reporters, the support of their commander, and the pride of acceptance within the officer corps in being able to carry out an assignment at which few of their colleagues could be successful. Until then, it is likely that in the average Army officer's view, Army public relations will be attended by a certain indefinable civet aroma.

The Month's Mail

(Continued from page 12)

Keep 'em Jumping—without Pay

• I concur one hundred per cent with Colonel Douglas's Cerebration [July]. I believe it is good to have an airborne pool of officers, so that in the event of need they are readily available. However, once an officer is airborne qualified, then what? There has been no provision made for him, and this problem is growing.

What provisions are available for a qualified parachutist to maintain proficiency when he is off jump status? None. Why not make provisions for those qualified to make proficiency jumps at least once every three months?

Another factor that would have to be considered is the availability of aircraft. So let's insert another provision: if aircraft and facilities are available, let the qualified parachutist jump at least once every three months in order to remain proficient. I do not advocate an officer receiving incentive pay for the proficiency jump. To prevent abuse of this privilege by jump-happy people, I'm sure it would be a fairly simple matter to record a jump. This record could be kept at the agency providing the jumping facilities.

This proposal should satisfy the officers who sincerely desire to remain jump proficient. The Army would benefit and so would the individual.

CAPT. REYNOLD E. PRICE
Weapons Dept. TIS
Fort Benning, Ga.

Let's Look at That Shoe!

• Bravo to Captain Herbert on "Myopia Amalgamated" in the August issue. And look who is doing the cheering! My signature is an obvious pen name, but it is that of an officer of the Regular Army Medical Corps.

If the shoe fits, I must wear it. Fit or not, it is evident for whom you tailored it.

You would not have had to abbreviate *Acirema Mechanics Amalgamated* for me to know what you meant. Give 'em hell! If I am directly questioned I will not plead the Fifth Amendment. I will admit that once I did carry a card in that union. But I finally got fed up and checked out.

I too resent the meddling of the AMA in military affairs. Every month when the *Armed Forces Medical Journal* (not a private journal like *ARMY*, but an official publication of the DOD) comes out, I am aghast all over again that they have been granted a full page in that publication.

But—in spite of having no love for the AMA—I do not believe that it is guilty of limiting the number of medical graduates. It just isn't so. And if you can grant me that, then maybe you can hear me out on a few other points where your allegory is misleading.

I believe the author has the wrong steer

on promotion. The idea, as I understand it, is not faster promotion, but higher initial grade. The Regular Army medic (with five years of post-baccalaureate training) has always come in as a first john, which puts him equal with the West Pointer four or five years out of the Academy. That takes care of the permanent captaincy for both at comparable times, but it does not give the medic a fair shake on temporary promotion. A good West Point second loonie makes first in eighteen months, not forty-eight or sixty months. The article made it in fifteen months, with captain four years later.

I cannot blame anyone his envy of a pay differential so long as it exists. But is the principle of the medical pay differential so bad? Isn't it the same principle that SAC and Cordiner are talking about? The idea is not to give the medic more than the quartermaster or gunner, but to try to give him not so much less than his colleague in civilian life. Might it not be that you will eventually be grateful to Medical for forcing the wedge that will raise your own pay to a level more in line with that of a civilian business executive?

I am glad that the author agrees that the pay raise will still not bring the Jusk mechanic up to what the private practitioner makes in the civilian trade. Not everyone realizes that.

Compare my status with that of my classmates. Phil B and I were close together in school—good buddies, and 1-2 in academic rank. In 1942 we went into military service. In 1945 I stayed in, he got out. In 1951 we both finished five years of surgical training. He went out into private practice, and in the first year he paid more income tax than the Chief of Staff draws in salary—including allowances! In 1951 I was a major (not bad), but the best thing about that year was that it was the first year that my pay check was entirely my own. Tuition in medical school was \$1,250 per nine-month session. It took a lot of allotments to pay back the man who financed me. How much were you in debt (for education) when you finished at West Point in 1945?

Do you wonder that I am grateful for the bonus, even if I am sincerely sorry it is causing hard feelings? Do you wonder that it makes me feel better with my choice of staying Army, when I just got a starting offer of \$22,000?

With \$22,000 staring me in the face I maintain my choice of Army only because I feel that I am performing an essential service in a proud organization. If the whole Army is as bitter about it as the author of that piece, it is time for me to sign out.

Does the shoe really fit? If it does, I still won't wear it. I will retire to some place where I can go barefoot.

S. Q. LAPIAS

THE MONTH'S READING

The Right Kind of Leadership

BRUCE CATTON
"Union Discipline and Leadership in the Civil War"
Marine Corps Gazette
January 1956

The comradeship that prevailed in the ranks [during the Civil War] was a prime element. The men knew each other; regiments were pretty largely homogeneous; out of this they built a very high morale. Pride in the regiment, and sometimes in the brigade, division or army corps grew up naturally and became an immense stimulus to good performance. And the very looseness of army organization seems to have brought forward uncommon qualities of leadership in the officer corps. There was an enormous amount of wastage, to be sure, as the test of battle weeded out the unfit, but in the end those regiments were extremely well led. Last of all, the human material was very, very good. By and large, I think, it was the same sort of material we have nowadays; I don't think the American people have changed a great deal. And the great lesson of the Civil War, to me, is simply this: that with volunteer American soldiers, the right leadership can do anything.

R&D: Key to National Security

"LETTER TO AVIATION WRITERS"
Aircraft Industries Association
20 July 1956

The primary function of research and development is to maintain a technological lead that cannot be challenged. There is no yardstick by which the amount of lead time required for a given objective can be measured. The timing of scientific breakthroughs is as inexact as the methods that produce them are exact. But today's research and development program is the decisive factor in the future security of the nation.

Congress this year appropriated \$1.6 billion for research and development programs for the military services. A major portion of this money will be devoted to work on the intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear powered aircraft, top priority projects on which the aircraft industry is working. Advanced propulsion systems and new types of aircraft will be developed. Scientists will delve into thermal problems generated by the ever increasing speed of both aircraft and missiles. Scores of other projects also will be pursued.

The money invested through appropriations today will determine what new weapons we will be testing in the early 1960's—the weapons that will be in combat inventories by the mid-1960's, some ten years hence. This long

research and development time cycle, from appropriation of funds to a usable end item in the military inventory, is the key factor in determining the magnitude of the research and development effort. Since time lost in research and development cannot be regained, every promising avenue must be explored, regardless of the complexity and difficulty of the problem.

Today the level of defense expenditures for research and development is moving to new peaks.

MILITARY R&D EXPENDITURES (In millions of dollars)

| | 1954 Actual | 1955 Actual | 1956 Estimated | 1957 Estimated |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Air Force | \$ 513.3 | \$ 524.2 | \$ 555.0 | \$ 610.0 |
| Army | 395.7 | 403.9 | 365.0 | 370.0 |
| Navy | 475.8 | 468.8 | 450.0 | 450.0 |
| Total | \$1,384.8 | \$1,396.9 | \$1,370.0 | \$1,430.0 |

During the five year period, 1940 through 1944, military expenditures for research and development averaged about \$245 million annually. Funds went into all-out production necessary for victory in World War II. There was not time for maximum research and development effort on radical new weapon systems. Fortunately, they were not needed for victory. Although the U. S. almost completely demobilized at the end of World War II, the importance of science and technology in determining victory had been seen. The average expenditure level increased for research and development in the next five years, through 1949, to about \$549 million annually. The Korean War brought a tremendous increase in appropriations by Congress for research and development along the entire technical perimeter. Defense expenditures for research and development in fiscal 1955 were more than double the \$650 million in 1950.

Assured Future for Hitchhikers

MAJ. GEN. PAUL F. YOUNT
Address, The Transportation School
5 June 1956

The coming of the nuclear age offers room for much rosy as well as dire conjecture. Its rosy prospects are particularly evident to the transportation hawks who can reflect happily on the fact that the equivalent of a million tons of TNT can be packed into a single atomic war head. Look at all the shipping space, cargo handling, rail cars,

ARMY

truck trailers saved, as compared to the time when the million tons of conventional product had to be actually handled as a matter of physical weight.

And nuclear fuel? A fistful of fuel is equal to a tanker load of oil. This promise of mammoth reduction in cargo space is such a pleasant dream that one can be lulled to complacency by it.

One can dream on about changes in configuration and weight. The QM may some day develop three round pellets to put in the soldier's pack to replace the three square meals he gets today. This decline in the huge dimension of the class I stuff we have to deliver, promises to soothe the palate of Transportation officers, even if the future fare will not.

The saving of cargo space and reduction of tonnage is certainly a pleasant thing to think about. The conceivability is there. No man today can afford to underestimate the ability of science. However, it does not follow that reduced tonnages if affected by concentrated explosives, food or fuel will reduce the need for transportation. On the contrary, the destructive power of the new weapon, the requirement for dispersion, flexibility and increased speed will place transportation at the same premium that it has always been in war. Revolutionary as the changes may be in warfare, you can be assured of this one constant. There will never be enough transportation.

Mysticism Ruled the Fighting Peasant

MAJ. GEN. J. F. C. FULLER
A Military History of the Western World, Vol. III
Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1956

First [Minister of War] Messimy thought of General Galliéni [for General in Chief], but as he had voted against Michel he set him aside and asked General Pau, who refused. Then he turned to General Joffre, who had never commanded an army—not even on paper—and who had no knowledge whatever of General Staff work. Joffre accepted, and asked for General Foch to be his chief of staff; but this was not allowed, because Foch was a Catholic. Messimy informs us that he selected Joffre because he possessed “a strong, powerful and lofty personality . . . a clear though slow wit . . . power of decision, though not very quick . . . and imperturbable sang-froid.” Be this as it may, because Messimy was only the tool of the General Staff camarilla which controlled the army, it would appear that the truth was that this irresponsible body had pushed Joffre forward because, as General Percin says, he knew nothing about what he would have to do, and that therefore it would be easier to make him do all that the General Staff required. In other words, from the General Staff point of view Joffre would make a good ventriloquist's dummy.

Joffre was the son of a cooper of Rivesaltes, born in 1852. He was a typical French peasant—slim though unimagina- tive, stubborn, astute, secretive and practical. He knew his own defects and he hid them. He seldom wrote a memorandum or read one. A man of simple mind, he liked

simple solutions and his staff fed him on simple précis of the subjects he had to deal with. As a general he was a strategical vacuum within which buzzed his General Staff. Nevertheless, as the fighting peasant he saved France, because he did not shirk responsibility, and because he was a man of great courage and also of great brutality. Though before the war he selected his own subordinates, once war was declared and they failed him he dismissed them in droves. In one month—August 2 to September 6—two army commanders, ten corps commanders and thirty-eight divisional commanders were retired, that is, about half the superior generals placed under his orders.

The theory of “mass plus velocity,” then held by the General Staff, exactly fitted Joffre's bull-like understanding. The offensive became his one and only aim, as it became that of his political master, President Fallières, who, in 1912, had asserted: “We are determined to march straight against the enemy without hesitation. . . . The offensive alone is suited to the temperament of our soldiers.” Thus Joffre became the instrument of a school of military occultism, a Bergsonian society, as Pierrefeux calls the General Staff, “whose doctrine was founded on the discredit of intelligence and favoured the cult of the intuitive.” These military occultists, backed by the *Comité des Forges de France*, were Joffre's brain, out of which percolated the plan of war. It was a pathetic simplicity, “*reposant*,” as Jean de Pierrefeux says, “*tout entier sur l'idée mystique de l'offensive. . . .*” [“Resting entirely upon the mystic idea of the offensive.”]

Indispensable Sanction

WALTER MILLIS
Arms and Men: A Military History of the United States
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956

The military system which [the British Army of 1775] represented may be schematically described. Not the least of the triumphs of eighteenth-century rationalism was its success in isolating and specializing the military function in society. The statesmen of that day were generally willing to accept the ancient scourge of war as an inevitable concomitant of the international social order. They were ready to admit, perhaps more realistically than many of their successors, that behind all the moral and legal imperatives there has always remained an element of brute force; that violence was not an ultimate but possibly an indispensable sanction in human affairs. Issues of pride, greed, ambition or interest were bound to arise among them, for which there could be no decision except by force, but which yet had to be decided in one sense or another if society was to continue to operate. The eighteenth century, as a rule, approached war in the spirit of Grotius, who sought to regularize and limit its savageries, not in the spirit of the nineteenth-century philosophical pacifists, who hoped to abolish it. Consciously or unconsciously, the genius of the age was directed toward confining its effects, reducing its devastations within the bounds of reason and law, and ensuring that it returned its necessary decisions with a minimum of disruption to the normal life of the community.



Up where the law of the
Yukon says only the fittest
survive

THE HUSKY GIVES WAY TO THE 'CAT'

Captain Perry Hume Davis II

INSTEAD of dog teams of half-wild huskies, the U. S. Army in Alaska is using powerful "cat" tractors to draw huge sleds of supplies to combat troops in the field. During the coldest months of last winter, the caterpillar drawn trains proved themselves by resupply of infantry battalions in the field during Operation Moose Horn.

During a period in which temperatures dropped to an official 58 degrees below zero, tractor trains resupplied infantry battalions that were on the constant move in simulated combat. Moving at two and a half miles an hour, "swings" consisting of one D-8 caterpillar tractor pulling two 10-ton sled loads and one D-7 "cat" drawing one 10-ton sled load, travelled supply routes up to 63 miles long. The 30-ton payload of the "swing" easily handled an infantry battalion's daily requirements of 28 tons of food, fuel and ammunition.


The tractors were standard commercial jobs, borrowed from Engineer outfits in Alaska. Most of the sleds were commercially made Mischler logging sleds, built by the Mischler Company of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and leased for Moose Horn from the Alaska Freight Lines. Others were experimental sleds designed for use at the Army Arctic Indoctrination School at Fort Greely.

The sleds will have to be redesigned, Engineer and Transportation Corps officers believe. Superstructure of the Mischler sleds was best, it was found, but their runners were too light and narrow. The Fort Greely sleds have 8-inch-wide oak runners (same width as the wheels of the famed Conestoga wagons of pioneer days and apparently still the best width for cross-country haul-

ing) but the sideboards were considered to be too light.

Some experimenters believe that one cat in each swing should be winch-equipped, but others feel that careful choice of routes will make a winch unnecessary. During the tests a D-8 tractor with two loaded sleds pulled 38-degree grades under its own power.

Manpower of the new supply unit will be small, considering its equipment. The cat train swings plodded across the Alaska wastelands with only three men aboard—two riding the D-8 and one on the D-7. All experienced cat-skinners, they spelled each other driving. For emergency use in the intense cold they carried arctic



Captain Perry Hume Davis, II, Artillery, USAR, a former contributor, is co-author with Major Vernon Pizer of *Your Assignment Overseas* (1955). He is presently on duty at the Public Information Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Alaska.

D-7 tractor rolls down a much better than average Alaskan trail drawing a 10-ton sled loaded with drums of gasoline.

tentage, gasoline stoves, food, sleeping bags, and other survival equipment, but they seldom used them. There were no breakdowns, and most drivers found it best to get their sleep at the turnaround point while infantrymen unloaded the sleds. The longest trip was 63 miles one way. It required 35 hours for the round trip: 16 hours up to the "front line," 7 hours to unload and sleep, and 12 hours back with a light load of empty gasoline drums. Usually the runs were shorter. Army planners figure in actual arctic warfare they would be from 20 to 40 miles. Individual rifle companies would be supplied from the battalion supply points by smaller sleds pulled by Otters or Weasels—full-tracked oversnow combat vehicles.

Soldiers who man the cat trains must be more than good cat-skinners. They must know how to live under extreme weather conditions, and to find their way across country in a land where snow makes landmarks useless most of the time. During the tests the three men on a swing were given a map marked with the spot where they were to deliver their cargo, and told the time they were to get there. From then they were on their own. In the six weeks of Moose Horn no train was lost, and none was late.

Do the tractor trains have a future in actual warfare? Yes, say Army planners. Most of the arctic and subarctic regions of the world, like Alaska, are undeveloped. There are few roads. Most of the country is wilderness, and when not snow-covered is swampy, muddy, or thick with brush and timber. The tractors can break their own trail, and work their way across the worst terrain. The huge sleds, built for snow, are just as good in mud.

And the weather doesn't bother them. When temperatures dropped below minus 25 degrees during Moose Horn the tractors were left running twenty-four hours a day because they were too hard to start when they got cold, and expansion and contraction of cooling and warming metals at those temperatures required extra adjustments of clutches and power-control units. But the tractors were built to stand long hours of operation, and no harm was done. Waist-high canvas shrouds around the driver's compartment of the cat kept the driver warm with engine heat without difficulty. And the tractors can run through any kind of weather.

In one instance during Moose Horn a battalion was to be supplied by an airdrop, but once in the air the pilot found high winds would not permit him to drop his cargo. He was forced back to the airfield, where a tractor train picked up the planeload of supplies and delivered them to their destination.


Close-up of the 10-ton sleds. Tests showed that the superstructure wasn't heavy enough to withstand the strains and stresses of Alaskan trails. But the 8-inch oak runners and steel drawbars stood up



At battalion supply points Weasels take over and move supplies forward. Final delivery is by an "abkio," a toboggan-like sled (here shown lashed on top of the load), pulled by soldiers on skis

"The smallest USO club in the world" was mounted on a 10-ton sled by the Army Arctic Indoctrination School





A transport aircraft designed along the lines of the Martin SeaMaster, the world's first multi-jet seaplane, would give great strategic mobility to Army forces

THE POSSIBILITIES OF WATER-BASED AIRCRAFT

GUY MALLERY

Could water-based air transports give Army forces the strategic mobility they must have in tomorrow's war?

IN the days of her glory, strategic mobility made it possible for Rome to hold her empire inviolate. She could reinforce any of her far-flung garrisons in a matter of days over the 50,000-mile network of roads which reached to all corners of the Roman Empire. These roads were as much a tool of

warfare as the weapons that the legionnaires carried. Roman commanders were expected to move their legions quickly to combat any aggressor action.

The essence of strategic mobility remains today as it was then: the capability of moving troops and their full combat equipment into contact with an enemy before he can achieve his immediate battle objectives.

We will consider here strategic mobility as a function of nuclear warfare—the problem we face today and tomorrow.

An aggressor with tactical atomic weapons and guided missiles needs only days—not months—to overwhelm a country. Unless we have superior mobility, tactical columns, making use of every mobility means in the modern strategist's manual, could rapidly overwhelm many of the countries we are committed to protect. The perimeter of

Guy Mallery has served on Martin's project for an advanced water-based jet transport for three years, and is now Project Engineer in the company's Advanced Design Department. Mr. Mallery served as liaison officer with the Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and has lectured on Army mobility at the Army War College, the Naval War College, and other service colleges and schools.

the Free World is vast; areas of possible attack are many.

Strategic mobility for our combat troops boils down very quickly to one phrase: air-transportability. Only by air movement can we place troops in contact with the enemy before he can accomplish his battle purposes. In a situation where a small ally might be overrun in a few days, we would have less than twenty-four hours to move into combat—fully equipped.

Air mobility poses three problems: What do we want to carry? Where do we want to carry it? Can we afford the aircraft? These three areas will govern the design of a strategic transport aircraft.

The Requirements

What will we carry? You are the commander of one of the new atomic-age airborne combat groups. Your unit is highly trained to operate as an isolated center of combat. Your tactical mobility, both on the ground and in your helicopters, is without parallel in history. Supported by air logistics operations you are tied to no base or road net. Your fire power is unsurpassed—guided missiles, rockets—with nuclear warheads if needed. You have, in essence, a complete, small army.

Which of these weapons would you be willing to leave behind when you are airlifted onto the atomic battlefield: Armored vehicles? Helicopters? Guided-missile batteries? These units do not grow magically in combat theaters. And

their weight and cross-section dimensions pose a problem when we try to airlift them.

Obviously, our country cannot fulfill its Free World commitments if, at the start of a war, we can airlift only men, duffel bags, and small weapons, with the major fire support, atomic defense, and tactical transportation following weeks later by slow surface-transport. Yet this is the position of our atomic-age air-transport system today.

Reduction in equipment size and weight is one answer, providing combat functions are not impaired. It does little good to substitute a ten-ton tank for a twenty-ton one if the lighter vehicle cannot do the required job on the battlefield. Design emphasis should be on satisfying the full range of combat needs rather than on compromising tools of war merely so they can be flown in today's aircraft.

Troop organization and equipment lists can have only one basis: battlefield requirements. Any compromise reducing battle capability for whatever excuse—politics, economics, air-transportability, or any other—must ultimately be at the expense of human life. Crete, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Korea—all are cases in point.

Of course, to meet immediate strategic mobility needs with today's air fleet, it is necessary to organize some "fire brigade" units on an air-transportability basis, rather than on a sustained-combat basis. But this should be recognized as an effect of our present

transport obsolescence, not as a cause for perpetuation of compromise.

The ultimate goal of our planning must be the arrival in the forward area of tactically intact, tactically equipped combat units.

The Target Areas

Our second consideration: Where will we carry these battle units? How will we land them?

This is where today's air mobility breaks down. Today's large transports are land-based. They require concrete runways if they are to land with the combat cargo of the atomic battlefield. These aircraft can deliver your complete battle group only into a fixed area, only after elaborate peacetime preparations, and only if the enemy does not destroy the airfield before we use it. Sanctuary from guided-missile, ground and air bombardment is imperative.


We must consider not only the enemy destruction of existing facilities but also the fact that there are areas where airfields of sufficient size are non-existent to begin with. In the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, particularly, such areas are many.

Were we limited to land-based aircraft, Army strategic mobility capabilities might suffer. Fortunately, modern aircraft technology offers another course: water-based transports.

For many years an Ugly Duckling among military aircraft because of its low performance, the water-based aircraft is experiencing a renaissance. The Navy has a new water-based minelayer-bomber, the P6M SeaMaster, with great load-carrying ability, speeds of over 600 miles an hour, and the flexibility of an aircraft that requires no prepared runway. A transport configured along the SeaMaster's lines could haul helicopters, guided-missile batteries, armored vehicles and many other pieces of equipment—and land in almost any area of the world. The rivers and lakes that dot the land masses of the world are ready-made landing fields for such an aircraft.

The water-based transport system does not require peacetime commitments of construction troops—does not encounter the peacetime political difficulties we are now facing in Iceland, Morocco and other areas. Its runways do not require a sanctuary from enemy bombardment.

Alone among aircraft, the water-based transport can be built large enough to carry every weapon of the



This silhouette of the SeaMaster shows how its hull is designed to place the entire keel under water. The abrupt steps and sharply curved contours of older, conventional hulls are gone. The SeaMaster has a speed of more than 600 mph and can carry a payload of 15 tons. Length is 134 ft. Height 31 ft. Hull width 10 ft. Span 100 ft.

atomic age, while retaining the basing flexibility of the smallest aircraft of its type. Rivers, lakes, coastal waters—these are the numerous runways for this type of aircraft. And these runways are virtually indestructible.

THE water-based system is not all sweetness and light, however. Methods of cargo handling are far from perfected. Over the last twenty-five years very little effort has been put into designing maintenance equipment for water-borne aircraft. While we have successfully operated hulled aircraft from ice and snow, we have never

sign factors which produce the lowest aircraft fleet size for a given airlift capability. This technique is obviously one of using high-speed aircraft. Fewer than half as many 500-knot aircraft are required to lift a combat unit in a given situation as would be required if 250-knot aircraft are used. While the 500-knot aircraft would cost twenty per cent more per unit, the fleet cost would still be substantially lower for the same airlift capability.

Another technique for reducing the cost of the mobility fleet is to program the aircraft for other uses after the mobility phase is complete. Typical of

erations to the logistics airlift could provide funds under existing budget levels for the strategic mobility air fleet.

To our previous criteria of size and water-basing, we can now add that the strategic mobility transport should have high speed. It appears that there exists a real need for the development of a transport aircraft meeting these requirements.

In the strategic mobility role, the water-based aircraft operates alone. In other missions it can be a member of a team. In the logistics resupply role, helicopters or STOL aircraft would form its distribution link. In any area not subject to enemy bombardment, the land plane could perform the missions.

It would be nice if commercial airlines could supply part of the Army's water-based transport needs. This is not possible, however. Water-basing is most advantageous to the operator who must go anywhere in the world, and who can expect to find someone shooting at his base when he gets there. It may offer comparatively little to the operator who flies only between centers of culture or population under peaceful conditions. Still, it may be that transoceanic airlines will prefer the new water-based transports because of their greater safety and comfort and their lower cost of operation.



The giant Mars seaplanes, which first went into service late in the Second World War, are still in service on the long cross-Pacific flight.

"systems engineered" this capability into aircraft. These and other problems are still to be solved. But they appear capable of solution. The systems approach on the SeaMaster should give us some of the answers in the next few months.

The \$ Sign

We have discussed two thirds of our idealized strategic transport: it should be large, both in payload and in cross-section, and it should be water-based.

The remaining question to be answered is: Can we afford the air fleet for strategic mobility? Remembering that strategic airlift can only have meaning if it is in being when required, a peacetime dollar sign can be of equal importance with the previous two (essentially military) discussions. Several approaches can be pursued that will insure maximum airlift capability at minimum cost.

A principal method is to choose de-

modern battlefield requirements is an air line of communications.

Logistics of water-based aircraft

While a discussion of the air logistics chain would require a full article in itself, it may be pertinent to state a few conclusions here.

Studies have shown that complete air resupply, using large, jet-propelled, water-based transports can reduce Communications Zone personnel by eighty to ninety per cent and reduce overseas supply pipeline inventories by a similar amount. The maximum savings occur with the largest and fastest aircraft. This aircraft is also the cheapest to operate (per ton-mile) from the dollar and from the fuel-consumption standpoints as well.

Since logistics provisioning and training are partly peacetime activities and since the atomic army will require an air logistics system, it appears that a peacetime transition in plan and op-

WHILE no one can say for sure exactly how the Army of the future will look, how it will be equipped, or how it will fight, several points are apparent. It will be highly mobile, it will have tremendous fire power, it will have a simplified logistics organization, and it will have the flexibility to fight anywhere in the world on any type of battlefield—atomic or non-atomic. This realignment of doctrine will be in vain if we cannot airlift the combat units—completely equipped combat units—into early contact with the enemy.

The techniques for satisfying the Army's strategic mobility requirements are within reach. Whether it is today's infantry regiment or tomorrow's combat group: only the water-based transport aircraft can transport the full range of combat equipment into any unprepared area of the world. The water-based transport system is a weapon in every sense of the word. It is aircraft technology at its most modern, designed to meet one of warfare's oldest problems—getting where the fight is before the enemy has it won.



THE NATIONAL GUARD

POLICY-MAKERS AND POLICY PROBLEMS

BRUCE JACOBS

THE National Guard's political power is supposed to make strong men tremble. It has been said that "when the National Guard Association cracks the whip, Congress obediently jumps." In a more moderate tone an *Army Times* editorial phrased it this way: "A program which receives Guard support is more likely to succeed than one which receives its opposition."

This is something of a laugh to the unit commander in Texas or Wyoming who can't find *anyone* who will shell out funds for a much-needed armory but it is no laughing matter in Department of the Army circles.

The National Guard has powerful friends among influential legislators on Capitol Hill; sometimes it is these very friends who make life most difficult for the Guard with extravagant claims and unrealistic boasts.

The political arm of the Guard is the National Guard Association. But the serious business of keeping the Guard a going concern is carried out by the National Guard Bureau, an official agency which enjoys an anomalous position in the Pentagon.

The Bureau, which is currently headed by Major General Edgar C. Erickson, a mild-mannered and amiable veteran Guard officer from Massachusetts, is the successor of the old Militia Bureau created in 1916. It is a Special Staff function at Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force level. As Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Erickson is supposed to advise both service secretaries (Army and Air) on all matters that pertain to the Guard.

In the other direction, that leading away from the Pentagon, the Bureau is the channel by which official policies are made known to the states' adjutants general. These gentlemen are the military advisers to the governors, and orders to Guardsmen from the Army must be channeled through them. It sometimes comes as something of a shock to an army commander when he learns that his orders to the National Guard units in his area should be "cleared" through the office of the state's adjutant general.

The outspoken, highly vocal (and highly effective) Na-

tional Guard Association dates back to 1878. The current, and seemingly perennial president, is Major General Ellard A. Walsh, retired, of Minnesota. Critics of NGA frequently lose sight of the fact that until the National Militia Board was established in the War Department in 1908, the Association was the only national agency interested in coordinating Guard activities. It works closely with the National Guard Bureau and as an organization of private individuals has the advantage of being able to engage in a lot of activities in which the Bureau, for obvious reasons, can not partake. The monthly publication, *The National Guardsman*, is the official mouthpiece of the Association and the semi-official voice of the National Guard Bureau. When the two differ, the magazine can be expected to support the National Guard Association's position.

Most Guardsmen react adversely to any suggestion that the Guard be brought under closer supervision of the Department of the Army. This opposition seems to stem from the occasional efforts that have been made over the years to take the Guard away from the states and install it as a fully federal force.

"... and keep your [political] powder dry."

The most recent "foray" in this direction was the premature revelation in the Pentagon that the Army was considering a plan that would put the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs office under one over-all Reserve Components Division to be headed up by a major general of the Regular Army.

Instantly the Guard Association thundered its disapproval. Guardsmen at once recalled the words of General Walsh, who often remarks: "It behooves us to keep our powder dry."

One Congressman immediately proposed a bill designed to protect the sanctity of the National Guard Bureau. Trouble was definitely brewing when General W. B. Palmer, Army Vice Chief of Staff, declared that there was



Major General Edgar C. Erickson
Chief, National Guard Bureau



Major General Donald W. McGowan
Chief, Army Division, NGB

"absolutely no danger" that the Guard Bureau would be eliminated.

But Guardsmen remain wary.

They still remember Dr. John A. Hannah, the eminent educator from the state of Michigan, who served a hitch as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. It was Dr. Hannah who very nearly upset the Guard's appellation with his outspoken effort to reconstitute the Guard. Dr. Hannah's position was weakened because he had, in effect, two plans which were not compatible. On one hand he wanted to reconstitute the Guard as a fully federal reserve; and on the other hand he wanted to maintain the Guard as a civil defense force.

On the question of federalizing the Guard, Hannah found himself with few allies. The right of the states to form militia organizations is a Constitutional guarantee—and under current laws the Guard fulfills this function and is at the same time an element of the federal reserve.

There seemed to be more support for Hannah's idea of dumping the civil defense problem into the Guard's lap.

In a speech at Lansing, Michigan, he declared: "Can you imagine Michigan consenting to have its National Guard units sent away if Detroit and Lansing and Grand Rapids were under aerial bombardment? Do you think the police and other public-safety organizations could handle the situation under attack without the National Guard to provide the disciplined leadership and control to handle casualties, open lines of communication, protect and care for the homeless, maintain order and restore civilian production? . . . Indeed, the National Guard has accepted [sic] a new role. . . . The Guard will assume a major share of the responsibility for guarding major industrial and population centers against such attacks as we have been considering."

The implications were plain. This was considerably more than simply giving the Guard an M-day role in our disaster plans. It was an attempt to jettison the Guard from the Army's war plans.

"If they want war, let it begin here," declared General Walsh, whose preference for fighting phrases out of history makes him a singular figure among current military orators. "If anybody believes that the Army National Guard can be built up and maintained by assigning it to a home

guard role in the national-defense system, he has never been more mistaken in his life, and the entire National Guard will resist to the utmost the imposition of any such concept."

Lingering doubts as to the Guard's eventual role in the event of war were dispelled by the Army's Chief of Staff. General Taylor has said that while he fully realizes that the requirements for civil defense are of serious concern, he feels it would be a "serious mistake" to permit the assignment of civil-defense missions to the Guard.

"There is a wartime mobilization requirement for every unit in our troop basis," General Taylor said. "There is a time schedule to which our deployments are geared which cannot be disturbed without critically affecting our overseas commitments. To accept in advance the dislocation of these carefully prepared schedules is militarily unacceptable."

The Guard has no intention of shirking its responsibility to its home communities. It just seeks assurance that it won't be stuck in an air-raid warden's job while other Americans are campaigning in the field. It is proud of the battle flags it has accumulated in all American wars.

Guard today has both a state and a federal function

The Guard today has *both* a state and a federal function even though control of National Guard organization remains largely in the hands of the governors and their adjutants. By way of background it should be pointed out that since 1916 the President of the United States has had a choice of two methods for bringing the National Guard into federal service.

The first is the "call," authorized ever since 1792; the other is by the "draft" or "order."

When serving by virtue of having been called, the troops are considered members of the National Guard of their own state, in the service of the United States. The call was used in 1916 when part of the Guard was dispatched to the Mexican border, and again in the spring of 1917, when Guard outfits were mobilized to protect bridges, highways, and power facilities. As state troops in the service of the United States each unit looks to its governor for appointments, promotions, and for new recruits.

For obvious reasons this method is scarcely acceptable in terms of the requirements of national mobilization and war. Therefore, when a National Guard unit is ordered to active duty its state designation is dropped and it comes under full federal control as an element of the United States Army. For example, the 102d Infantry Regiment, Connecticut National Guard, becomes the 102d Infantry Regiment, United States Army, when ordered into federal service.

For a clear understanding of the Army-National Guard relationship it must also be borne in mind that the National Defense Act of 1933, as amended, created the National Guard of the United States, thus giving Guardsmen a dual role—that of members of the state militia and also of members of the Reserve establishment of the United States Army. It was as members of NGUS that the National Guard was ordered into active federal service by the President in 1940 and 1941 for training in accordance with the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. In similar fashion, eight Guard divisions and many nondivisional units were “ordered” into active service during 1950-53, the period of the Korean conflict.

Most of the appeal of the Guard stems from its traditional existence as “a hometown team.” Yet, in the three most recent conflicts of major proportions local units have been broken up.

The Hometown Team

Does the Guard concept foster neighborhood cliques that could impede an outfit's usefulness? To several generations of Guardsmen (and non-Guardsmen, for that matter) this is the \$64 million question.

In *A Soldier's Story* General Omar N. Bradley openly discussed his own reaction upon assuming command of the 28th Infantry Division in 1942. He found it to be an outfit “afflicted with the problem of companies in which hometown cliques still survived.”

General Bradley's personal testimony goes on to relate that: “When noncom vacancies developed in those units, the stripes ordinarily went to the hometown boys. Moreover, civilian associations between officers and men in those companies made discipline more difficult to maintain.

While commanders disapproved of the favoritism that ensued, they seemed powerless to halt it. I concluded that as long as we tolerated those neighborhood clubs, we could never have a division.”

His own solution was “a drastic move . . . In a single order [I] transferred every officer and almost every noncom out of his hometown unit. . . . The division took new heart and the 28th soon began to show the keen edge of a trained combat team.”

This, in a nutshell, is a point of view which makes Guardsmen redden in anger.

Rightly or wrongly, it is a state of mind that has persisted through the years. The wholesale relief of Guard officers was fairly commonplace in World War I when the Regular Army was largely populated by officers with scant respect for the militia. In *America at War* historian Fred-eric L. Paxson tells how this policy undermined the 26th Division:

“Their units, some with a military past extending to the Revolutionary War, had an *esprit* based upon tradition, local residence, and sometimes social standing. Among them there was an undercurrent of resentment at a military policy which broke down local connections and which appeared to be based upon a belief that National Guardsmen could never be more than amateurs. The long legislative struggle to fit the organized militia into a scheme of national defense . . . left scars on both sides. Before the 26th was ready for the front its officers had come to feel that Regular officers were prejudiced against them, and that the cards were stacked. When, in the midst of the Argonne fighting Edwards [Major General Clarence R. Edwards, a Regular officer who was quite favorably inclined to the Guard] was relieved of his command . . . a long post-war controversy was started. . . .”

According to the Yankee Division's historian, “These changes were made by general headquarters at Chaumont and the policy continued to the end.”

After the war General John J. Pershing admitted that Guardsmen and their units had not received unqualified support.

History, nevertheless, repeated itself in World War II and again during the operations in Korea, when National Guard officers and noncoms, according to General Walsh,



Major General Ellard A. Walsh
*President
National Guard Association*



Brigadier General George J. Hearn
*Chairman, Committee on
Legislation, NGA*

were "relieved on any pretext, and sometimes on no pretext at all." There was at least one known incident when the commander of a high headquarters summarily relieved every National Guard officer on duty. At one overseas headquarters a pamphlet was published which commented upon the incompetence and corruption rampant in the army of one of our allies and went on to liken this to the situation in the National Guard. When General George C. Marshall learned of this incredible paper he angrily ordered its rescission. This didn't rectify the damage already done.

All officers approved by Regular Army

For the Army to have serious *en masse* reservations about Guardsmen and their ability to command is to reflect doubt upon the Army itself. Would-be Guard officers must appear before Regular Army boards; all Guard officers must be federally recognized in order to hold office and this means the same tough physical standards that go for the Active Army. For purposes of promotion Guard officers must meet the same standards that are set for other reserve officers.

The National Guard continues to feel, strongly, that its "home-town team" concept is sound. It also believes that this concept has been hurt by past Army policies.

"We visit a boy's home and try to sell him on the advantages of military service with his home-town outfit—but what happens?" a field artillery battery commander in Ohio (whose 37th Division underwent the experience in 1951) explained. "His older brother pipes up, 'Yeah, and you know what happens when the bugle blows—the Army moves everyone around all over the lot.'"

Sending National Guardsmen into battle as replacements is "gross deception," says Senator Henry C. Dworshak of Idaho. "It is not keeping faith with the men and their families."

Senator Edward Martin of Pennsylvania has said, "Wise commanders know that men attain greater gallantry in battle when they fight by the side of comrades who know and understand them."

Guardsmen who attempted to point this out during the partial mobilization of 1950-53 were ignominiously labeled "crybabies." But cold facts indicate that during the Korean conflict Guard units were stripped of up to seventy per cent of their key personnel by pipeline requirements. In thirteen months of training, for example, the 43d Infantry Division shipped out some 6,000 officers and men. And, although only two Guard divisions actually reached the front, over 160,000 Guardsmen served on active duty during the operations in Korea.

National interests must come first

The other side of this is quite obvious. In times of national peril the Department of the Army must act in the national interests. And when units committed against the enemy are depleted in strength, replacements from every available source must be rushed forward. In 1950-51 not only were National Guard units stripped for replacements, but so were all Regular Army outfits, notably such combat-ready "fire brigade" outfits as the 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions.

The National Guard is not a crybaby outfit, and while it would like a more positive decision on this business of unit integrity, its energetic unit commanders still use an array of telling arguments in behalf of the Guard and its home-town team idea.

"I always point out," says a West Virginia lieutenant in an armored cavalry outfit, "that a large number of Guardsmen wouldn't stay with their units anyway because their training and background prepares so many of them for a direct commission or a crack at OCS."

An artillery sergeant who signed up ten new members during the 22 February 1956 "Muster Day" in his home state, said: "Look at it this way: say there is a mobilization and the outfit *does* get shuffled around. The average young guy who is in the National Guard will make the transition from civil to military life with a lot less sweat. Wherever they send him he's got the edge over the fellows who come in fresh from civilian life."

Not all the Regular Army shares the view expressed by General Bradley. One who stood up and said so was Major General Charles H. Gerhardt, wartime commander of the 29th Infantry Division. General Gerhardt declared in a letter to *Combat Forces Journal* following the publication of excerpts from the Bradley book, that although he found some few changes desirable no wholesale transfer of officers and noncommissioned officers was considered. "To disrupt a corps of command . . . by wholesale transfer appears to me unnecessary and would result in an unnecessary hardship on the command."

Weapons and equipment

Is the Guard saddled with obsolete World War II equipment?

This question comes up frequently in any discussion of the Guard's readiness. This is an intriguing question since much of the Guard's equipment is vintage World War II. But to a large degree, this is also somewhat true of the active Army. This is a period of transition, and the Guard, naturally, is not getting full allowances of new weapons and equipment before the active Army itself is fully equipped.

Nevertheless the progress in this respect once again makes today's National Guard a far cry from the Guard of yesterday. Some of the contrasts are quite startling.

Before World War II the Guard's new weapons and equipment were provided for on exactly the same basis as the Regular Army—but the Guard's allotment existed only on paper. Actual new weapons and equipment were rarely issued. For example, there was a time when the horse was officially set aside as the main means of transport—but little if any modern motorized equipment made its way to Guard armories in the thirties.

"We were," recalls one Guardsman who is still young enough to be a vigorous battalion commander today, "condemned to doing the best we could with what was left over from 1918. All we could do was hope for the best. I have to think of this," he added with pride, "every time I look out at my motor pool."

A typical Guard division called to active duty in 1941 had no antitank guns, no antiaircraft weapons, no modern field artillery or tanks. This is in sharp contrast to the picture in the Guard today. This was certainly driven home



General Taylor addresses the 1955 General Conference of the National Guard Association at New Orleans. Guard officers from every state in the Union attend these conferences, which during President Walsh's mildly autocratic regime have been directed with military precision and absence of tomfoolery

to me during a trip to Guard field training at Camp Drum when I sat in a reviewing stand and watched the roll-by of a National Guard armored division that was armed to the teeth with modern medium tanks, self-propelled guns, armored field artillery, and modern engineer contrivances of all descriptions. And this was only half of the division—the rest was on a training mission in the field.

"At the present time," says Major General Donald W. McGowan, Chief of the Army National Guard, "there are no equipment shortages which adversely affect training. We are getting support from the active Army in this respect. There is no begging that issue."

An illustration of the scope of this "support" was seen in the recent transfer of 630 vehicles valued at around \$6.5 million from a disbanded aviation engineer brigade to the California National Guard. California Guard units thus came into a windfall of essential dump trucks, cargo trucks, all-purpose vehicles, wreckers, vans, trailers, and water-tank trailers.

New equipment brings in recruits

Proper equipment is important to the Guard not only from the viewpoint of training. Having the proper equipment on hand enhances a unit's attractiveness. In many communities I found that recruiting had gone up significantly *after* the arrival of new 155mm artillery pieces and *after* the arrival of new tanks such as the Walker Bulldog.

Can the Guard take care of its heavy equipment and rolling stock?

The answer is yes—but it needs help. It is important to remember, every now and then, that Guardsmen are still only part-time soldiers.

"Every time I look at this," the commander of a newly formed reconnaissance company remarked as he pointed to a new tank, "I get just a little shock. This isn't like the

Regular Army. If something goes wrong there aren't maintenance experts close by to diagnose the trouble."

This is a fairly important and urgent question to a young man who wears two bars on his collar a few hours a week—but is responsible for better than a quarter of a million dollars' worth of military gear, some of it standing in a muddy yard out in back of the armory because there are no funds for garages and tank sheds.

Maintenance requires trained technicians

Consider the nature of, say, a tank company. The unit commander, who is a captain in his early thirties, holds down a full-time civilian job. He devotes a good measure of his "free" time to the Guard—far more than the required weekly drill sessions. Even so, he is faced with problems far more complex than those of simply training a company.

In addition to obtaining and training men he is responsible for a healthy investment of Uncle Sam's money, in the way of tanks, trucks, signal equipment, plus all the traditional supply and administrative problems.

Don't get him wrong. He isn't whining or griping because he's got this dandy array of equipment. He's happier than hell because it means he can give his men a decent training program.

But the more he looks at his heavy equipment the more he begins to think of the future—and the days when "the bugs" begin to show up in the tanks, when the signal equipment goes on the blink. He knows full well that, unlike an active Army outfit, he hasn't many experts who know the ins and outs of the business.

Perhaps there are Guardsmen who will take this as a manner of "knocking" their profession. Far from it. These too are simply the facts of life.

Thus far the best solution to an increasingly pressing problem seems to be in what the National Guard Bureau



NATIONAL GUARD SERGEANT LEADS DOUBLE LIFE WITH AN 'ON SITE' BATTERY

In civilian life Charles A. Moore (left) is a gun mechanic, employed by the State of Virginia at the on-site location near Alexandria, of Battery D, 125th Anti-aircraft Artillery. On drill nights and during summer encampment, he is Sergeant First Class Charles A. Moore (on gun here), gun platoon sergeant of Battery D.



refers to as the Army National Guard Technician Program.

The key figure in this program is the fellow you generally meet during a daytime visit to a Guard armory. Usually he's in fatigues because if he isn't working in the supply room, or banging away at a typewriter, he's likely to be working on weapons or machinery. He is the unit administrative-supply and maintenance technician (ASMT).

He is both a Guardsman and a civilian employee of the state who is paid out of federal funds according to his rating in the civil service scale.

He works closely with the unit commander on recruiting, handles the unit's records and equipment, and is probably the caretaker as well. The chances are he's got more work than he can really handle.

The technician program also provides for staff assistants (civilian employees who are commissioned officers in the Guard) plus an administrative-supply technician at battalion level.

The civilian technicians are the backbone of the Guard's participation in the on-site program. Here you have numerous National Guard antiaircraft batteries in locations where the Guard has actually taken over missions formerly assigned to active Army AAA. At each battery site there are fifteen full-time civilian employees who are also Guardsmen. This "cadre" is capable of warming up the guns while the rest of a unit (which drills once a week like any normal Guard outfit) race out to the site from their homes or civilian jobs when alerted.

There are others in the technician program—mostly at the state headquarters detachment level. For the most part they are employed in field maintenance shops as radio repairmen, fire-control electricians, artillery mechanics, welders, shop foremen, and maintenance supervisors. They are also the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers, the storekeepers, supply clerks, fiscal accounting clerks and field auditors.

But to a tactical unit that is concerned with training and the state of its readiness the key fellow is their ASMT—the unit technician who is the outfit's chief cook and bottle-washer.

After taking a long and considered look at the Nation's National Guard, I am now full of confidence in its ability to tackle any reasonable job which may come its way.



The present-day National Guard has its shortcomings, but it is probably better prepared for a phased mobilization than at any previous moment in our history, and it is probably more advanced in its readiness than most comparable units of the Army Reserve.

Its morale is high because its training facilities are high and are ever-improving, its training is as realistic as armory-type training can be, and its equipment is on hand—not on paper.

General McGowan has seen the Guard go into battle four times in his lifetime. As the former commanding general of New Jersey's 50th Armored Division, he is realistic on the subject of readiness. "The Guard," says General McGowan, "is well aware of its own deficiencies. It is constantly striving to overcome its problems and to improve its state of readiness and combat potential."

"We're getting fine support from the active Army," General McGowan told me during one of several conferences

held in the National Guard Bureau. "There are at present no shortages which adversely affect training."

There are those to whom National Guard is a dirty word. They are the ones who express concern over the Guard being a state military arm and who are stout advocates of full federalization of all reserve components.

"That kind of attitude," says a National Guard officer whose opinion the writer respects, "is just fighting the problem. The Guard is in existence in its present form and has grown strong under its existing organization, whatever we think of it. Consequently, instead of fighting the problem, we ought to face the facts of life and come to an understanding."

What he means is, "Here is what we have—how can we make the best use of it?"

But the tendency in any discussion of the reserve forces question is to dwell at great length upon the things which are *wrong* with the National Guard system.

And conversely, it is regrettable that an advocate of the Guard must, in a sense, reflect criticism upon the Army Reserve. Or so it seems. This is unfortunate, because it is only lately that there has been any real impetus from Washington for a strong Army Reserve. On the other hand, the Guard did a most remarkable job of reorganization in the days that followed the conclusion of World War II.

All that should matter, in reality, is that we have a system that gives our Nation the best possible reserve force.

I happen to be of the personal conviction that there is an important place for both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in our plans. But in terms of which happens to be best prepared to carry out its missions *now*, there is little doubt that the Guard is out in front.

Sixteen years ago, when there was talk of our need for a strong National Guard, the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., then a United States Senator from Massachusetts, declared in *The American Magazine* for September 1940: "We are witnessing one of the great convulsions of history, such as man has endured every century or so in the past. No man can tell how it will end. But for some time to come Americans will know what it is to live dangerously, as our ancestors used to do."

These prophetic words are no less true today than they were in 1940, as we linger on the brink of war.

Even after a major war and a serious brush-fire war, we are still living dangerously.

The place of the National Guard in times such as these is obvious: it is in our first line of readiness.

"We have always been fortunate," General Taylor has said, "to have patriotic citizens who are not only willing to come to the colors after war starts but are far-seeing enough to organize and arm themselves in anticipation of emergency. This great tradition was established by the volunteer militia of the colonial period and is carried on today by the National Guard."

This is the sort of expression of faith which the Guard well understands.

We may be quite sure that when and if the emergency ever arises it will find the National Guard ready to take its place alongside the Regular Army in the line of fire.

(Mr. Jacobs is undertaking a similar examination of the Army Reserve which will appear in these columns within the next few months. The Editors.)

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

Mobile Manpower Within NATO

THE press and statesmen have been discussing ways and means of revitalizing NATO. While a great deal can be done in the economic fields, at least one military means for mutual and self help has not been fully used: military manpower as distinguished from the dispatch of military units. No nation's manpower and supply requirements remain static. At times various NATO members have had manpower shortages, and at others manpower to spare. Right now, for example, it is obvious that France direly needs qualified military manpower of all types, while in the United States the shortage of doctors for both our armed forces and civilian population has been called critical. Certain NATO countries have excess manpower. Italy, for one, is plagued by chronic unemployment, while Germany probably has an excess of doctors who are financially unable to establish their own practice.

The problem is easily stated and easily solved. An agreement among NATO nations could embrace these principles: (1) Permit volunteers to serve in the armed forces of any member state, thus fulfilling all or part of their military obligation to their own country. (2) Implement this program through a series of bilateral treaties between NATO countries. (3) A model for such a bilateral treaty could be drafted by the NATO staffs for study by each member nation and for use between them.

Additional benefits would accrue to both sending and receiving states. Receiving states would get qualified volunteers for one, two or three years, to serve where needed, not necessarily in the NATO area. During the Korea emergency, a setup like this would have enabled the United States to recruit relatively large numbers of troops from NATO partners to serve in or with our forces there at the time. The contribution of other NATO states would not thus have been limited by financial ability to support national contingents in the Far East. Also, at the

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time, certain NATO states were not members of the UN and so were unable politically to send full-scale national contingents. The case of Italy comes immediately to mind, and the same situation would prevail today for West Germany. Further, we have learned that nothing ties citizens of nations together so much as service in a common cause. There are no better friends of France or Britain than those American volunteers who served with their forces before our entrance into the World Wars. I can think of no better way to cement future Franco-German relations than for thousands of young German volunteers to serve in the current Algerian crisis. They could serve for relatively limited periods without the "stigma" that might attach at home to enlistment in the Foreign Legion.

Many potential sending states have not had troops in active military operations in any numbers for over ten years. While they have enough experienced military power for field-grade and higher levels, they find it increasingly difficult to recruit experienced men for NCO and company-officer grades. Such nations might well encourage their own young professional soldiers to serve a year or two with the French forces, for example, at this time, giving them full credit toward retirement and seniority within their own forces upon return.

Many details would have to be worked out, but the important thing is the acceptance of the basic principle that military manpower within the

North Atlantic group is mobile, freely available to members in need, and that service in a NATO partner's force be credited as home country service.

MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT

Sell the Army from Inside

WE all know that in the Regular Army many of the men in the lower grades are not of the type we should be attracting. The type of drafted men who would most benefit the Regular Army are the ones who are getting away from us as soon as their legal obligation is fulfilled, so that they can return to a good job or complete their schooling. So the Regular Army must create the appeal. In order to retain these high-type draftees—we are getting them—we must imbue our lower ranks with a feeling of responsibility and respect to make them want to stay. But you can't blare out an appeal that goes in one ear and out the other.

Most enlisted draftees who serve the minimum time are accustomed to a social or working standard above the everyday routine of the soldier. They feel that certain drudging duties are beneath them, and just can't see the appeal of a Regular career when these jobs go with it.

There are six conditions which I think create this distaste for the life of a soldier among such high types.

Kitchen police duty can be irksome or enjoyable. In most cases it irks because of the punishment tag that goes with it—a carry-over from Old Army days of sending a man to the grease pit for an infraction.

Guard duty falls into the same pattern. When the punishment element is eliminated and the duty considered an obligation and yet a privilege, it will have appeal.

Extra duties are, in some cases, used as punishment. But routine details to extra duty, with proper supervision and control, can be dealt out so as to create the impression that they are workaday jobs that have to be done.

Improper supervision is another con-

trolling factor in the chase-out of the good draftee. The highly intelligent draftee who is poorly handled by NCOs and officers loses whatever taste he acquired for a military career.

Inspections fall into the same category as the first three conditions. Until we institute an honor system of self-inspection the draftee will be swayed by inadequate rules of inspection, and continue his way into the discharge stream.

Observation could be the corrective for all the conditions I have mentioned. You cannot persuade a drafted man to enter a life two years of which have created distaste to the point where discharge is his only hope of relief. If he has not shown during that time that he proposes to follow a Regular Army career, there is no doubt as to what he will do. If he can be swung over only by last-minute pleading, he is *not* the type you are waiting for in your undermanned unit.

The hundreds of enlisted men discharged each month should go forth to sell the Army for what it is, and not for what it has been. But the indoctrination must be carried on from date of entry into service to date of discharge or reversion to Reserve status. Every detail of a soldier's service must make him feel that he is needed, that his background and training are being used, and that he is respected for performing his peacetime obligation—not in the sense of duty well done by subordinate to superior but in creating the feeling that there is a career in the Regulars.

Propaganda and experiments are not the answer. The job of selling from inside the Army must be done.

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Why wouldn't it be economically sound, from the standpoints of procurement, distribution, and development to have two basic uniforms: a service uniform for garrison duty and a field or combat uniform? These could be made up from the best parts of all the uniforms now being used by the four services.

The problem of accessories could be

met by using the present insignia and other devices of the respective services. The Navy could continue to use shoulder boards for rank insignia, the Air Force could continue to use the scrambled eggs device on the cap visor for colonels and above and the inverted chevrons for NCOs. The Army could even go back to the Sam Browne belt as an accessory to the same basic uniform, and enlisted men could continue to use present insignia of rank.

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Further, it would be possible to obtain replacement items at the nearest base, whether it be Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps.

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He has brilliantly demonstrated how it is for members of a particular part of the "whole" to assume the role of "experts-for-the-whole"—the potential leaders responsible to the men and for the selection of a set of actions "from a wide range of strategic opportunities."

Many other military experts do agree with this usage. For example, General Mead Earle finds the necessity of distinguishing between "grand strategy" and some run-of-the-mill variety of "military strategy" or just plain "strategy." Others would divide the field into "political direction" and

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THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

Mobile Manpower Within NATO

THE press and statesmen have been discussing ways and means of revitalizing NATO. While a great deal can be done in the economic fields, at least one military means for mutual and self help has not been fully used: military manpower as distinguished from the dispatch of military units. No nation's manpower and supply requirements remain static. At times various NATO members have had manpower shortages, and at others manpower to spare. Right now, for example, it is obvious that France direly needs qualified military manpower of all types, while in the United States the shortage of doctors for both our armed forces and civilian population has been called critical. Certain NATO countries have excess manpower. Italy, for one, is plagued by chronic unemployment, while Germany probably has an excess of doctors who are financially unable to establish their own practice.

The problem is easily stated and easily solved. An agreement among NATO nations could embrace these principles: (1) Permit volunteers to serve in the armed forces of any member state, thus fulfilling all or part of their military obligation to their own country. Implement this program through treaties of bilateral treaties between NATO countries. (3) A model for such lateral treaty could be drafted by NATO staffs for study by each member nation and for use between

Additional benefits would accrue both sending and receiving states. Sending states would get qualified volunteers for one, two or three years to serve where needed, not necessarily in the NATO area. During the emergency, a setup like this has enabled the United States to recruit relatively large numbers of men from NATO partners to serve with our forces there at the time of contribution of other NATO members would not thus have been limited by financial ability to support national contingents in the Far East. Also,

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time, certain NATO states were not members of the UN and so were unable politically to send full-scale national contingents. The case of Italy comes immediately to mind, and the same situation would prevail today for West Germany. Further, we have learned that nothing ties citizens of nations together so much as service in a common cause. There are no better friends of France or Britain than those American volunteers who served with their forces before our entrance into the World Wars. I can think of no better way to cement future Franco-German relations than for thousands of young German volunteers to serve in the current Algerian crisis. They

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Propaganda and experiments are not the answer. The job of selling from inside the Army must be done by all of us to counteract outside influences and attractions. I believe that such an inside sales campaign over the next couple of years would result in a great increase in RA enlistments. The effect on the civilian population would be worth many millions of publicity dollars.

CWO ARTHUR J. SNYDER

Unify the Uniform

WHILE a common uniform does not make a group a team, four uniforms in the Department of Defense don't make sense either. It would be about as logical to have a football team with the middle of the line dressed in khaki, the ends in Navy blue or Marine Corps green, quarterback with a composite uniform of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps colors, blocking half in

khaki, passing half in Air Force blue, and fullback or safety man in mufti.

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Capt. Charles R. Goodpasture, QMC, a student at the QM Subsistence School in Chicago, entered the Army in 1942 after graduation from University of Illinois and served with Armor units in ZI and ETO. He has served in a Food Service capacity with several large commands including a theater and an army headquarters.

Capt. William J. Lowes has had long experience in command of companies and various detachments with a wide assortment of missions. Basically an Infantryman, he has also served with Ordnance and AG type units. He is now with Hq. 2d Battalion, 61st Infantry, Fort Carson, Colo.

met by using the present insignia and other devices of the respective services. The Navy could continue to use shoulder boards for rank insignia, the Air Force could continue to use the scrambled eggs device on the cap visor for colonels and above and the inverted chevrons for NCOs. The Army could even go back to the Sam Browne belt as an accessory to the same basic uniform, and enlisted men could continue to use present insignia of rank.

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"military strategy." But this method of clarification seems to complicate and confuse a layman rather than to clarify the term. And it is precisely the layman who votes on a national decision.

Perhaps the meaning of the term (to say nothing of the grandiose aura of prestige, deference, and respect which somehow halos both the indiscreet and informed users of the word) will multiply as time goes on. But, frankly, the term is relatively useless at the present time—useless because it means too many things and/or not enough; useless because it is over-used and useless because too many nondecisive, lower-echelon, uninvolved persons find fascination rather than face in its phenomenology.

It does most certainly appear that Dr. Page in the next pages of the July issue has decided that "national policy" avoids all the pitfalls of "strategy" as a noun proper to the decisions affecting the whole state. This choice is extremely useful and in the penetrating, original discussion of the Army in relation to the problem "concerning the whole nation" its utility is readily apparent.

Can we save the term "strategy"? With care, yes. Careless references and imprecision by men who ought to know better may be responsible. In a rush to say more than can be said in a given space of prose, the communicator might fail to communicate by using will-o'-the-wisp words. Patience, simplicity and accuracy in such discussion of war and peace will help to preserve those distinctions so intimately connected with our security. But most of all we must all agree with those verbal distinctions.

CAPT. RICHARD J. BUCK

The Food Program Is Good

AN activity so vast as the operation of Army field ration messes is bound to engender criticism and recommendations for what are considered improvements. Several criticisms in a *Cerebration in ARMY* for February 1956 ["Good Food Without Food Service"] should not go unanswered.

The author recommends that metal mess trays be replaced with chinaware. Units are still authorized to provide their own chinaware, provided it is not chipped or cracked. But experience has proved that metal or plastic trays are more economical, and quite suitable.

As for going back to the garrison ration, that system was adequate for a small, static peacetime army, but it is unsuited to an expanded army. It had

its merits, for it gave the initiative of mess personnel full reign and enabled an efficient manager to provide extensive variety and monetary savings that could be used for embellishments. One disadvantage was the extensive competitive bargaining between the community and military messes, and between military messes themselves, which resulted in higher costs. Another disadvantage was that monetary credits were based on present-for-duty strength, and units drew such credit regardless of whether meals were eaten. There was lack of standardization in menus. Menu planning was a command function, and often consideration of cost prevailed over nutritional value.

While the present system is not perfect, it has resulted in a well-balanced and nutritionally adequate menu for all troops, a centralized and economically operated procurement system, a saving to the Government in food purchases, and a technical advisory staff of subsistence and food service experts to assist any unit commander in his feeding problems.

"Prescribe family type feeding in unit messes to keep troops out of lines." Although discouraged in the interests of economy and efficiency, family-style feeding is not prohibited. In Army messes, as in modern civilian restaurants, the cost of producing and of serving a meal is usually less when cafeteria style is used, and food waste is normally lower. Besides, cafeteria style was used in some messes during the days of garrison ration, although family style was more general where messes fed small numbers of men.

"Pay the cost of these improvements by eliminating Food Service personnel below installation or division level." The "improvements" in this suggestion are merely assumed. Through close supervision of unit messes and food facilities, Food Service personnel at below installation and division level are perhaps the strongest links in the chain. Proper supervision by them eliminates head-count padding, food waste, and mismanagement.

"Make unit medical officers responsible for routine mess sanitation." The Food Service program never intended to eliminate medical personnel from the sanitation field. AR 30-11 places responsibility for insuring proper sanitation in food facilities on The Surgeon General.

"Return complete control of the mess

to the unit commander and avoid prescribing in detail exactly how he must operate it." AR 30-11 and SR 30-11-1, the bases of the Food Service program, clearly outline the unit commander's responsibilities. Neither these nor any other D/A directives relieve the commander of his responsibility, nor have they taken control of his mess from him.

The trouble seems to be that passive commanders have permitted or encouraged the local food adviser to assume their responsibilities. Where this has happened you can be sure that weakness existed in the unit command or an erroneous interpretation of the aims and functioning of the Food Service program.

CAPT. C. R. GOODPASTURE

Dispersion Remedy?

WHAT I have to say is more of a question than the answer to the problem of dispersing troops. Perhaps experimentation with it will put the answer into the field manuals.

To a very slight extent I experimented with a buddy system of troop dispersion during daylight and found it rather manageable. Carrying forward the same principle as in the use of two-man foxholes, troops in the open can maintain greater distances between buddy teams, yet not feel the loneliness of individual dispersion.

If we train team members to stay two to four yards apart while moving, that is close enough to give morale support to one another. Then by dispersing teams so that they are twenty or forty yards apart, the target mass is unremunerative.

One advantage of the two-man system is that two men will check to see that distances between groups are maintained. This is a great advantage over requiring each man to continually check distances at a time when his thoughts are likely to be on other things. This is especially true in the light of functioning teams outdoing collections of individuals. It is equally useful as a double opportunity for the squad leader to control his men, since each team member can see for two men. Finally, target coverage is apt to be better.

Soldiers who have trained together for some time are not so much a problem in this respect as are replacements. Is it not possible that by applying this as a standard we may come up with an all-around workable solution?

CAPT. WILLIAM J. LOWES

*In their diagnosis of Stalin's "constant factors,"
Soviet military theoreticians accept Western thought
though twisting it to fit the dogmas of Marx and Lenin*

Soviet Military Thinking Since Stalin

N. GALAY

THERE is a considerable difference in the methods by which Stalin has been attacked as a Communist ideologist on the one hand and as a commander and the genius of Soviet military science on the other. The first took place suddenly, and can perhaps be likened to a surgical operation. However, his deposition in the military sphere was not so abrupt and took place gradually, beginning earlier, shortly after his death. His deposition as a military genius was largely bound up with the need to review the litter he had left in Soviet military doctrine. This process had to all intents and purposes been completed a year before the political attacks were launched at the Twentieth Party Congress, and is evidenced by articles written by Marshals Sokolovsky and Rotmistrov published in the Soviet Army's official organ *Krasnaya Zvezda* on February 23, 1955 and March 24, 1955 respectively. However, the revision of views on Stalin as a military leader has not yet removed him from his pedestal. His role is being played down and that of his senior officers, now holding leading positions in the Soviet armed forces, enhanced. These men are the marshals and generals who were active commanders during the war and were directly responsible for defeating the enemy forces. The Soviet press also began to use the term "Supreme Command" to denote those who had been in charge of armies or army groups. The fact that the authority of the senior military leaders was enhanced was of greater psychological than political significance. Stalin's eclipse meant that the authority of the present commanders had to be raised in order to preserve the forces' faith in their leaders. At the same time there was need for a revision of the theoretical premises of Soviet military doctrine, to which the name "Stalin" was usually prefixed. This could be done only by a group of men with sufficient au-

thority, hence the emergence of the Supreme Command. An analysis of the fundamentals of Soviet military theory linked with Stalin's name shows to what extent a revision was necessary after he died.

The Stalinist Heritage in Military Theory

Soviet military theoreticians have described Stalin's views on war as "a system of knowledge of the regularities of war, of methods for preparing and carrying it out in a definite historical situation." They moreover distinguished between "genuine" Soviet military science, and "pseudo-scientific," bourgeois doctrines.

Prewar Soviet writings devoted much attention to the concept of Soviet military doctrine. Frunze defined it as "that teaching of any army which establishes the nature . . . of the armed forces, the methods of training the army, and its direction in battle, based on the predominating views on the character of the tasks facing [it] and on the methods of solving them."

After the war, Soviet military science was given the task of establishing the definite, irrefutable laws of war. This question had not arisen before. At the same time Soviet theoreticians, acting at the direct command of Stalin, condemned their "pseudo-scientific, bourgeois" counterparts for their attempt to establish fixed principles of war.

This contradiction becomes intelligible when one takes into account the fact that, to Soviet theoreticians, military science, as mentioned above, is divided into true and false categories. They considered that the latter, the so-called "bourgeois," was not in a position to pin down the regularities of war. They argued that it could be done only by original, Soviet science which is independent of the West and based on the Marxist theory of society and history. All influences of and traces left by

both the classicists and contemporary Western theoreticians were declared by Stalin himself anti-scientific and harmful to the Soviet Army. This was done in the form of a directive which stated that the time had long since passed for respecting the reactionary teachings of Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and others, as well as the modern pseudo-doctrines of Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, Guderian, de Gaulle and Eimannsberger. The leading military commanders of World War II were also attacked, particularly Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley and the German generals Brauchitsch, Manstein and Guderian.

STALIN'S theses were strengthened in the postwar period by numerous theoretical researches designed to reveal the falseness and unscientific approach of Western military theory, both classical and modern. Most criticism was leveled at Clausewitz, whose chief mistake was held to be the philosophical indeterminism of his theories on war. These were contrasted to the deterministic regularities of war discovered by the Soviets. At the same time former Russian military theory, which had been passed over in silence by the Soviets up to World War II, was evoked to support the Marxist authority of the Soviet premises. The claim that it had played a leading role in the general development of military science, and the acclamation of such historical Russian figures as Peter the Great, and Suvorov as important contributors to general military science were designed to create not only Marxist forebears but also famous sons of the fatherland. Stalin was acclaimed the founder of Soviet military science, which he regarded as something completely new and containing only a few of the finest traditions of the past.

Without entering into polemics on these theories, whose pretentiousness

From Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR. (Munich) June 1956.

and emptiness are clearly illustrated by the inclusion among the classicists of German military science of Keitel, Hitler's chief of staff, whose contribution in the sphere was negligible, one must note the clearly defined tendency toward a complete isolation and official neglect of the general sources of military science. None of this is to be found in prewar Soviet military doctrine, which made widespread use of general theory and adapted the tenets of Clausewitz, Moltke, Delbrück and many others, as well as numerous operational ideas of modern foreign theoreticians to help formulate their "proletarian" doctrine. Admittedly, the "Stalin" theory in fact had not shed this heritage but had only claimed as its own, features which it had adopted and developed. Thus, the strong influence which Clausewitz had exerted on Lenin regarding the principle of the preeminence of politics over strategy and the evaluation of moral factors in war; Moltke's ideas on a "single military doctrine;" the application to military theory and affairs of Verdun, Vernoy's "applied method" and of Delbrück's ideas on the influence of social and economic factors on the development of military affairs; Schlieffen's operational theories; Schlichting's theory on the tactics of carrying out a meeting engagement; and a number of operational theories of Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, Herr, Bruchmüller and Guderian—all showed that general military theories had been made use of.

The influence on theory of these foreign classical and modern premises was even more marked because the heritage of the old Russian military experts, such as Suvorov, Rumyantsev, Potemkin and Lazarev, dated back to the comparatively distant past and therefore was far removed from the realities of contemporary social and technological developments. Later Russian theoreticians were themselves under the influence of Clausewitz and Moltke, who may rightly be considered the founders of modern military science. Thus, the "Stalin" theory is, in fact, based on a number of sound general theses.

Sources of Military Science

Since the war Soviet theoreticians have been striving to discover historical roots for their ideas and to establish the authority and originality of Soviet military science. As long as this touched only on questions of opera-

tions and high-level tactics things went fairly smoothly and without any pernicious influence on practical application. This was also facilitated by the fact that the treatment of operations as a separate subject on a level between strategy and tactics is a feature peculiar to Soviet military theory, which borrowed it from the old Russian Army. As far as the technique of commanding and training armies is concerned, there is little to show who was the originator of the different operational and tactical premises. The theory of the art of warfare and the tactics of combat operations were worked out according to the models provided by the general fund of military theory and in the light of personal experiences gained during World War II.

However, to support their claims to originality, Stalin and other Soviet theoreticians had to contribute something to the highest sphere of military theory: strategy. A contribution was made during the war in the form of theses on constant factors which play a decisive role in the course of a war, that is, on basic principles.

The Development of 'Constant Factors'

Stalin, on behalf of Soviet military theory, divided these basic principles into primary and secondary, the constant and temporary features respectively. The primary factors comprise, (1) the stability of the rear, (2) the morale of the troops and the home front, (3) the number of divisions and their quality, (4) equipment (5) the quality and capability of the commanding cadres. All other factors, such as distance, climate and experience, were secondary features, of which surprise was mentioned as the most important.

Soviet theoreticians noted the decisive significance of these principles for gaining victory and pointed out the transient value of the other, secondary features, provided that everything be done to ensure that the primary factors could exert their influence. The collapse on the Russian front in 1941 of the German Blitzkrieg, based on the element of surprise, is quoted as an example of the way the constant factors function. The formulation of these general principles as the primary ones is extremely indicative, since it shows more than anything else the narrow, practical nature of Soviet military theory. Thus, this theory is only a typical military doctrine and not a science. In fact, the concept of military doctrine

drawn up by Moltke and adopted for the Red Army in the early twenties by Frunze determines this theory, which takes from the general all-embracing body of abstract theses and methods precisely defined features. These are designed for practical application under concrete conditions at a given technical level in a definite military and political setting and for an army characterized by definite national features. Therefore, military doctrines are usually qualified by a reference to nationality.

If we bear in mind the time when the basic Soviet principles concerning the five constant factors were formulated (they were announced by Stalin in February 1942, and thus coincided with the relative stabilization of the Soviet front after the defeats following Hitler's sudden onslaught) their practical and conditional nature becomes clear. At that time the surprise factor had already ceased to be of importance. On the other hand, the stability of the rear, the state of the army's morale, the numbers and quality of the troops, the type of equipment and the capability of the commanding staff were essentially the shortcomings which permitted Hitler to gain his initial victories and brought the USSR to the verge of disaster. The defection of hundreds of thousands of men, the defeatist attitude in the country, the poor quality of the Soviet divisions and the shortage of equipment due largely to losses were the main concrete weaknesses which had to be overcome. They were indeed overcome in the course of the war, but the actual principles necessary to achieve this under the conditions prevailing at the time were put forward as absolute, immutable laws applicable for all times. They had, moreover, the added force of having been promulgated by Stalin, and, as a consequence, remained up to his death the unchangeable and basic philosophy of Soviet military science, even though the rapid development of the technique of war, the revolutionary effect on theory produced by atomic strategic and tactical weapons and the development of high speed bombers with enormous range have introduced completely new prospects into the theory of war and the methods of waging it.

These prospects were evidenced by a new swing towards strategy by the destruction method, because of the possibility of waging a blitzkrieg war due to the huge destructive power of the new atomic weapons and the opportunities for bringing them into action

quickly and suddenly by air. Thus, the surprise factor and the advantages of a preventive blow virtually permitting the enemy to be broken in a very short time have become of the utmost importance.

New Ideas in Soviet Military Theory

It may be said with certainty that even before Stalin's death the leaders of the Soviet armed forces had recognized that, as far as theory was concerned, they were in a state of stagnation, due to new developments in military affairs and the dogmatization of the conventional principles of the past.

The new trends in doctrine were revealed only after Stalin's death. The way in which they came to light was typified by two articles in the leading journal of Soviet military theory, *Voen-naya Mysl*. In September 1953 an article by Major General N. A. Talensky was published under the title "The Question of the Nature of Laws in Military Science." The author, professor at the Voroshilov Supreme General Staff Academy and associate of the Historical Section of the General Staff, was the first to cast doubts on the basic thesis of Soviet military theory, namely that Marxist military science has a monopoly of originality. These doubts were revealed in his attempt to formulate a basic law of warfare. He rejected the idea that different social formations have their own specific laws for achieving victory. In this way, without expressing himself in full, Talensky opposed the isolation of Soviet military theory. In spite of the fact that the article went on to advocate the attainment of victory by destroying the enemy in a series of successive engagements, that is by wearing the enemy down and observing Stalin's five constant factors, it evoked a counterattack. Vice-Admiral I. Eliseev, in an article with the same title, criticized Talensky's formulation of the law of warfare as one applicable to both sides and pointed to the existence of specific laws for each social formation.

There is little doubt that the discussion on this occasion was inspired from above, since from that time the Soviet military press and official Army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* began regularly to give quite objective accounts of the views of the West, chiefly America, on the application of tanks and aircraft and the actions of troops when atomic weapons are being used. Although these reviews always contained attacks

on American policy, they usually concluded with the opinion that foreign statistics and ideas deserved serious study, since the Soviet Army had to be prepared to fight a powerful, well-equipped enemy and had to know and understand its enemy's tactics. At the same time articles began to appear describing atomic and nuclear processes and discussing questions of atomic defense. All this demonstrates the significance attached to the new atomic weapons and to the progress made by the West in this respect, as well as indicating the attempts of Soviet military thought to free itself.

THE articles by Marshals Sokolovsky and Rotmistrov, published in the spring of 1955, showed that a distinct step had been taken towards emancipating theory from the shackles of Stalinist military science. Sokolovsky emphasized the significance of weapons with enormous destructive capabilities, the tremendous development of high-speed aircraft and jet propulsion and pointed to the increased importance of the surprise factor. After expressing his satisfaction with the work done to improve the Soviet armed forces and provide them with the latest equipment, he demanded that all available achievements be utilized and progress be made as rapidly and as imaginatively as possible in the sphere of military science. The fact that military cadres are obliged to study thoroughly not only the history of and experience gained from past wars, but also the most recent achievements both in the Soviet Union and abroad was viewed by Sokolovsky as a sign that the problems of carrying out military operations under the new conditions of war would meet with success. He considered the need to deprive the "aggressor" of the advantages derived from the element of surprise, while not allowing oneself to be thrown into confusion, to be the general aim of such preparations. He stressed quite unequivocally that it was not enough to be merely prepared and to be able to meet blow with blow.

Close attention to 'Surprise Factor'

These statements by the head of the Combined General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces officially promote the surprise factor to one of supreme importance for the Soviets too. At the same time they remove Soviet theory from its isolation from military science in general and bring up the question

of the need for waging war as a preventive blow. In this way Soviet theory is being fundamentally revised and the new ways it can be adapted to the changing factors outlined.

Marshal Sokolovsky's article, which was designed for wide circles of Soviet society, did not put the finishing touches to this revision. However, Marshal Rotmistrov, head of the Stalin Armored Forces Academy, in his article "For a Creative Solution to the Problems of Soviet Military Science" tolled the death knell of Stalin's military theory. Rotmistrov attacked the thesis of constant factors playing a decisive role in the outcome of a war. Rotmistrov's attacks centered on the significance of the surprise factor. He asked what role this factor played under present conditions when atomic and nuclear weapons come into consideration, and himself answered the question. He stated that there has never been any doubt that surprise has always played an important role and in some cases has had a decisive influence on the outcome of a war. Moreover, this factor today could, if atomic and nuclear weapons were used, be one of the chief factors not only at the start of a war but at any time during the course of it. He added that the fact that works dealing with the five constant factors barely mentioned the surprise element could hardly be termed a creative approach to the solution of the problems facing military science.

Rotmistrov then went on to prove by the dialectical method that the constant factors he had criticized had to be preserved. He claimed that even bourgeois military men and science have not rejected the importance of the constant factors, though they call them by other names.

Rotmistrov concluded his article by raising the question of distance [space], which the Stalinists had regarded as of secondary importance. He attacked the view that distance could be used to lure the enemy deep into the country in order to defeat him later. This is again an attack on Stalin himself, who had made a theoretical virtue of necessity in order to justify his counterattack maneuver after an allegedly planned retreat during World War II. Rotmistrov regarded distance as important, since it permitted the population, the centers of industry and all production resources to be scattered over a wide area, a factor he believed would be of great benefit in an atomic or nuclear war.

Irons in the Fire

'Mechanical Mule' in Production

Within a year, first delivery of \$3 million worth of four-cylinder burden carriers will be made by Willys Motors to the 101st Airborne Division. The lightweight carrier, long in development and test, has a platform 100 in. long and 46 in. wide that stands 27 in. off the ground. Willys is producing them under supervision of the Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command at Detroit Arsenal.



First M48A2 Tank

This is the first of the Army's M48A2 medium tanks to roll out of the ordnance plant of Alco Products at Schenectady, N. Y. Produced under a \$73 million contract, the tank has an improved range finder and target-tracking equipment.



'Radar Ruler' for Surveyors

A radar set that can accurately measure distances up to 50 miles in a few minutes has been developed by the Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories and produced by Motorola, Inc. The equipment consists of two radar antennas and two jeeps loaded with 200 lbs. of equipment. As a radar signal bounces back and forth thousands of times a second, computers count the catches and register the distance in terms of time. Operators can quickly convert this into a high-precision point-to-point measurement.

On the Anvil . . .

- Louisville Cap Company announces a self-adjusting, non-rust steel spring support for the overseas cap. Available in most Army exchanges, it can also be ordered for \$1.00, postpaid, from the maker, Louisville 12, Ky.
- A helicopter flight simulator, incorporating the cockpit of the Army's H-37A Sikorsky helicopter, is to be developed by Melpar, Inc., for the Army. It will be used to train pilots in all phases of flight operation.


Talking Sense Through Your Hat


It is now possible to talk through your hat and make sense. A two-way military radio, weighing only a pound, and smaller than two packs of cigarettes (*see cuts below*), has been developed by the Army Signal Corps. It fits into a molded helmet made of steel-tough synthetics. Planned for rifle-squad use, the radio can send messages up to a mile distant and receive messages from greater distances. Transistors and batteries fit into two small metal cases that snap inside the helmet.



To answer a call, the soldier merely flips a switch and talks into a microphone about the size of his thumb.

When talking might give away his position, the soldier can push a button at the side of his helmet and acknowledge a message with a short "beep" tune. The radio can "net in" with standard Army radios. Messages transmitted by it could be picked up behind the lines and leapfrogged to any point in the network.





Workhorse to Get Turbine Engines

Cutaway photograph of Army H-21 helicopter shows how two General Electric T-58 gas turbine engines are to be installed by the Vertol Aircraft Corporation. Contract for the development was by the Navy for the Army. Installation is expected to give more reliability, higher performance including increased all-weather capability.

Flight Tests for XV-3 Convertiplane

The Army-sponsored Bell XV-3 convertiplane (*right*) has made conversions up to 15 degrees forward mast angle in flight without incident during Phase I flight tests. General evaluation flights in helicopter configuration indicate low power requirements in forward flight up to 80 knots. Convertiplane's vibration level is very low because of flexible rotor mountings. Autorotation checks from 500 ft. altitude reveal the Bell XV-3 has excellent power-off characteristics.



Robot Helicopter

Demonstrated by the Kaman Aircraft Corporation, the robot copter *at left* can make surveillance flights over a battlefield and send back information by TV, lay communications wire and take aerial photos. Here shown under control of a ground operator, the robot can fly a "memory course" fed by the ground control station, or from directions given by an airborne control station installed in another helicopter.

C-130 Makes Test Drops

The Lockheed prop-jet C-130 troop and cargo carrier recently dropped a 27,000-pound load successfully during a series of aerial delivery tests. It was the heaviest single load ever extracted by parachute from an airplane for aerial delivery. The record-breaking load, consisting of a platform loaded with iron, was dropped from an altitude of 2,000 ft. with six 100-foot cargo parachutes. In another test the C-130 dropped 18 A-22 containers, said to be numerically the largest multiple load ever dropped. Total weight was 29,000 pounds. What may have been the world's first multiple drop of three units from one plane was made when an M55 gun mount, a 105mm howitzer, and an Army jeep were lowered smoothly to the ground. Total weight was 14,500 pounds. In another test a combination load consisting of road grader, weighing 19,000 pounds, and a 40mm gun mount, weighing 7,500 pounds, was dropped.

New Cessna Transport

Cessna Aircraft's new four-engine executive transport, the Model 620 (*right*) now undergoing taxi tests, is powered by four GSO-526-A Continental engines, each developing 320 hp on take-off. Wind-tunnel tests indicate a cruising speed of 235 mph with 70 per cent power at 18,000 ft. and a maximum speed of 269 mph.



THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Refreshing Frankness

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The Technical Services; Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply
By Chester Wardlow
Office of Chief of Military History, 1956
564 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.25

Reviewed by
MAJOR JOHN E. MURRAY

A mirror is a liar. You look at it every morning and there is no revelation of the fact that you are growing older.

Only a highly polished reflection such as Historian Wardlow's product gives the shock and fact of age.

It is not so simply because this middle volume of a trilogy on the Transportation Corps in World War II has nostalgic photos of a general officer in boots and breeches and an NCO with buck sergeant stripes. It is more the written facts, beside tintype treasures, that give the perspective.

Doctrines, dicta, and sweeping organizational changes have hammered the Winged Wheel wearers into a corps, young in age but old in experience. Wardlow writes of vanished things.

His ports of embarkation, victims of the dispersion doctrine, have given way to terminal commands; oversea supply divisions have fallen to the dictum that supply considerations should override those of transportation. Thus oversea supply agencies today are operating limbs of the logistics staff.

The wave of unification inundated the Army's transport service when the Navy took over the Army's fleet. The same billows are buffeting still, and the Navy (as well as Air Force) under Single Manager edicts has lately relinquished traffic management to the Army's Transportation Corps.

General Somervell, as Wardlow relates, was disturbed at the critical shortage of ships. In 1943 he directed General Gross, the first Chief of Transportation, that in event the shipbuilding program was endangered, "I want you to scream your head off."

The precocious TC voice must have been basso profundo at birth for that year the ships built in the United States reach a whopping, all-time peak of nearly twenty million tons. Unlike most infants, the fledgling corps wasn't given a chance to creep. So some of its steps were an understandable wobble. Thus, Wardlow

doesn't tell a research and development story. There was next to none. Properly buried in the obscurity of a footnote are a few lines on a fiasco concerning a type of barge that was developed, and then couldn't be depended upon to float.

This refreshing frankness prevails throughout.

As one would suspect, the matter of movements preponderates. Three fourths of the text—five chapters—are allotted to this subject which is the Transportation Corps' special domain.

Training and supply—common to all technical services—are given a chapter apiece. The author, in dealing with supply and training, dwells upon those birthmark distinctions which enable the viewer to distinguish between identical twins; or, in the case of the technical services, septuplets. The Transportation Corps was the only one of the seven technical services in World War II that had to struggle for recognition as the weakest and smallest of an otherwise robust Army Service Forces brood. The supply and training stories, therefore, though short, are an aptly labeled "theme of handicaps."

The movements story has more sweep, as fits the subject. Movement, in a word, sums up the actuation, flow, and control of men and matériel to meet the broadest strategical and tiniest tactical need. It is one half—the life half—of logistics. The problem of animating supply, of shooting the system with know-how plasma, of backing up the planners' pipe dreams with



Movement is the life half of logistics. Food and supplies pour into Bastogne.

realistic pipelines, is all part of the Transportation Corps movements saga. Here it is well told.

Just turned fourteen last month, and spawned in the war of which Wardlow writes, the Transportation Corps can look back with this volume at the cataclysmic cradle in which it rocked.

Competent Military History

THE MILITARY HERITAGE OF AMERICA
By Col. R. E. Dupuy and Col. T. N. Dupuy
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956
794 Pages; Maps; Index; \$10.00

Reviewed by
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON

There was never a time when Americans had such a need-to-know concerning the facts of both United States military policy and military history as the present. For the dangers which faced our infant republic were as nothing compared to the awesome challenge presented today by the Moscow-Peiping Axis. For as Soviet Deputy Premier Kaganovich so bluntly stated on the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power, "the twentieth century is a century of the triumph of socialism and communism." Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker has clearly emphasized the seriousness of this threat. In an address on 9 April 1956 he pointed out that "today we are engaged in a global cold war with the Communist hydra which is just as meaningful a conflict, and just as fraught with urgency, as if we were actually shooting it out with them."

The authors of *The Military Heritage of America* bring this entire global picture into focus when they say: "Call war an extension of diplomacy, condemn it as a plague, thrill to its so-called glories, as you will. The fact remains that it is not just a phenomenon, something monstrously foreign to our civilization, but—whether we like it or not—it has been a fundamental element of man's struggle for existence. Therefore, until man's nature changes, war is likely always to be with us, in one form or another."

The Dupuy father-son team paints on a broad canvas America's military story from the colonial period down through the Korean conflict. Interwoven in their presentation of our own heritage in arms, they have included valuable accounts of the development of the art of warfare, the greatly increased significance of eco-

nomic and scientific factors in warfare, and the inter-relation of European and Asian wars.

Their scope is broad, but it is narrowed here and there by important sidelights which illuminate the major themes. Thus, especially pertinent in view of the current Soviet propaganda campaign to disarm America, is the reminder that in the late 1920s and in the 1930s "there was a wave of war hatred—natural but naïve, depending on isolationism, and nurtured by careful pacifist propaganda, often Communist-inspired. It was directed against arms manufacturers . . . and against any and all advocates of national preparedness." Thoughtful Americans should firmly resolve that never again should a Chief of Staff be placed in the position, with reference to our defense posture, where he is forced to say that "further discussion is unnecessary to support the general statement that the funds provided have been insufficient for even an approximate realization of the military system contemplated in the National Defense Act."

The authors conclude with a brief but challenging analysis of the warfare of the future in which is underscored the need for all our citizens to acquire an understanding of, and to take an active interest in, the military policy of the United States. The stakes today are much too high for any American to feel that he can remain aloof from this problem. For, in the world of 1956, a sound military policy is nothing less than life insurance on our national future. As the writers point out: "The terrible nature of the hydrogen bomb . . . has led some people to believe that future war will be so destructive that, rather than resort to force and thus contribute to the destruction of civilization, we should submit to any future aggressor who threatens the use of such weapons in war." Coexistence, they hold, even if it means submission to some alien tyranny, should be the choice, rather than to have all we know and hold dear utterly destroyed in a nuclear war. If such people are right, then indeed the lessons of past wars have been invalidated. Their argument, however, is self-contradictory. Should another nation be willing to chance the destruction of civilization in circumstances too awful for us to risk war, there would be no question of coexistence. "Our civilization . . . would shortly cease to exist. . . . Sir John Slessor, who as Marshal of the Royal Air Force is one of the leading British strategists of our time, has this to say: 'Recent history should be enough to prove that war is never prevented by running away from it. . . . There are worse things than physical extinction.' If this is so, as we firmly believe, then the only way to save our civilization, or any worthwhile element of it, is to be able and willing to fight to preserve it."

All students of the military art should give a resounding vote of thanks to the father-son team which produced this book. Both scholars and practitioners of the military profession, they have made a distinct contribution to the growing volume of competent, readable American military history.

Headshrinkers, Brainwashers

THE RAPE OF THE MIND: The Psychology of Thought Control, Menticide, and Brainwashing

By Joost A. M. Meerloo, M.D.
World Publishing Company, 1956
320 Pages; \$5.00

Reviewed by

LT. COL. PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Dr. Meerloo writes like a grave, humane man, which he is. He started as a staff psychiatrist in Dutch hospitals before the war, became involved with the Dutch underground, was caught by the Nazis, escaped to England, became a colonel—as a matter of fact, the colonel—of Dutch psychological warfare, came to the United States and became a citizen in 1950. The layman may not realize it, but his professional career has been marked by as much courage as his military life. Dr. Meerloo dares to be a citizen as well as a physician; he has the bold talent of speaking out on subjects which his more careful colleagues leave alone.

The Rape of the Mind is the first general and inclusive book to attempt coverage of the controversial subject of brainwashing from the psychiatric standpoint. He writes for the educated layman, and it is likely that any reader of this magazine will be able to follow the book all the way through, despite terms like *verbooracy*, *totalitaria*, *menticide* and *labelomania*, which are neither accepted scientific terminology nor standard English.

As a matter of fact, Dr. Meerloo's book is bracketed by two other presentations

which come closer to standard means of communication on these difficult subjects. One is journalism; the other, professional psychiatry. The journalism consists of the two unsurpassable books by the newspaperman, Edward Hunter—his *Brainwashing in Red China* and his more recent *Brainwashing: The Story of the Men Who Defied It*. Hunter is an old China hand whom your reviewer has known since 1930; his style is lurid but he is careful with facts. Hunter started the national vogue for the term "brainwashing"—by translating the Communist slang *hsi nao*, "scrub brains"—and irritated a lot of professionals by writing racy, clear, authentic journalism about a horrifying subject.

The professional approach is perhaps best exemplified in the current (May 1956) issue of *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, published in Washington. Dr. Edgar H. Stein has an article on "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted 'Brainwashing,'" and Dr. Robert J. Lifton an article on "'Thought Reform' of Western Civilians in Chinese Communist Prisons." Between the two articles they do an excellent job of covering what the Chinese have been doing to the brains of their prisoners.

Where does Dr. Meerloo come in?

Unfortunately for some readers, luckily for others, Meerloo is in the middle. *The Rape of the Mind* is a serious but unorthodox political book containing some psychiatry, a great deal of sociology, some politics, and the author's opinions. It is neither first-hand journalism on what the Communists have actually done and to whom they have done it—Hunter covers this—nor is it the kind of language psychiatrists use in talking to each other, when they attempt that rather painful process.

Meerloo's is a call for freedom against the crimes of dictatorship, an appeal for the strong and sane mind in a world of fear and threats. His four sections deal with very terrible problems of our time—techniques of individual and of mass submission, unobtrusive coercion, and the issue of defenses. He meets the new U.S. code of military conduct, but he does not provide the shop talk which Army people might expect.

In brief, this is a good book, but it is not *the* book which you may have been looking for—the book which really explains brainwashing all the way through. For journalism, get Hunter's books, for they are good reading; for medical information, have a Medical Corps friend borrow or buy the magazine, read it yourself, then talk it over with him. After you have set the subject in order, turn to Meerloo. This book is an inspiring overlay, but there is no topographic map of solid, accredited information underneath it.

THE MONTH'S REVIEWERS

Major John E. Murray is Special Assistant to the Chief of Transportation.

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Lt. Col. Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, commanded Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, in the Inchon-Seoul operation.

Col. Aaron A. Gunner is the pseudonym of an Artilleryman who contributes reviews occasionally.

Col. William C. Foote, Artillery, Retired, is Secretary of the American Military Institute.

Major Orville C. Shirey, USAR, is a former contributing editor to ARMY.

Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 72 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ADVENTURE IN DIAMONDS. By David E. Walker. W. W. Norton & Company, 1956. 223 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50. British Intelligence and Dutch patriotism deprive the Germans of huge stocks of diamonds; true adventure in economic warfare that reads like fiction.

THE APOSTLE OF LIBERTY: A Life of LaFayette. By M. de la Fuye and E. A. Babeau. Thomas Yoseloff, Publisher, 1956. 344 Pages; Index; \$5.00. The new, much discussed life of LaFayette, which portrays America's favorite Frenchman as a man of more integrity than brilliance, more princely interlude is a very small portion of ciple than political acumen. The American whole.

JAPANESE FOOD AND COOKING. By Stuart Griffin. Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1956. 165 Pages; \$2.75. We just can't understand people who order ham and eggs in Paris, so probably we're biased in our opinion that this is a must for families going to Japan. Over a hundred recipes.

RICHARD THE THIRD. By Paul Murray Kendall. W. W. Norton & Company, 1956. 602 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.95. A scholarly but readable biography of one of history's more controversial characters.

RUSSIA LEAVES THE WAR. By George F. Kennan. Princeton University Press, 1956. 544 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50. Russia's troubled days, from November 1917 to March 1918, as reconstructed by one of America's most dedicated students of the Russian scene. Our former Ambassador to the USSR explains America's part in these earth-shaking events.

THE UNDAUNTED: The Story of Resistance in Western Europe. By Ronald Seth. Philosophical Library, 1956. 327 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00. A country-by-country survey of the European resistance movements during World War II; an over-all view rather than the blood-and-thunder tale of individual groups. For historians and specialists.

Perhaps Dr. Meerloo can write that missing book himself. His personal history, his patriotism, and his courage, along with his keen intelligence, attest that he may.

High Level of Confidence

U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA, 1950-1953; Volume II: The Inchon-Seoul Operation

By Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1956
361 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.50

Reviewed by

LT. COL. EDWIN H. SIMMONS

Of all the possible landing sites on the west coast of Korea, Inchon was probably the least desirable from a tactical and technical point of view. The sea approaches were tortuous. There was a 30-foot tide which left exposed at low water vast expanses of mud flats which threatened to be a deadly trap for landing craft. The "beaches" were stretches of commercial waterfront faced with piers and sea walls. Behind the beaches was the labyrinth of an Oriental city. Time and tide conditions dictated a last-light landing hour. But General Douglas MacArthur was not to be dissuaded from his choice of targets.

"The best I can say," said Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, the Attack Force

commander, "is that Inchon is not impossible."

"We shall land at Inchon," replied the imperturbable Commander in Chief, Far East, "and I shall crush them." Events were to prove MacArthur right.

The Korean war was scarcely a week old when he first asked Washington for a Marine RCT with appropriate air support.

The 1st Cavalry Division, in the process of receiving an amphibious refresher from Navy and Marine specialists, was originally scheduled to accompany the Marines in the landing. Deteriorating conditions in the south of Korea caused a change in the details of the original plan. The 1st Cavalry Division was re-scheduled for an administrative landing at the east coast port of Pohang-dong. This unopposed landing, while not a headline-catcher, was, as the authors point out, "a timely demonstration of Navy and Marine amphibious know-how and Army energy . . ." On D-day, 18 July, 10,027 troopers along with 2,022 vehicles and 2,729 tons of bulk cargo were put ashore.

The Marine RCT was similarly diverted from its original destination. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated at Camp Pendleton, California, on 7 July. Marine Aircraft Group 33 (consisting of three squadrons) was its air component. This force while en route

to Japan received a change of orders which landed it at Pusan on 2 August.

On 10 July MacArthur asked JCS to send him a Marine division. The Marine Corps had no division to give him. Shrunken by postwar economy measures to less than 75,000 men and officers, it maintained, in name, two divisions. But the 1st Marine Division on the West Coast had been stripped to man and mount-out the Brigade, and the 2d Marine Division, nominally home-ported at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, had commitments extending from Labrador to the Mediterranean.

On 15 July MacArthur repeated his request for a war-strength Marine division with its own air support, setting a deadline of 10 September. General Clifton B. Cates, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, advised the Joint Chiefs that the provision of such a division was contingent upon the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. On 19 July, the date of MacArthur's third request to JCS, President Truman authorized the call-up of the Reserve. There were two Marines on the rolls of the Reserve for every one in the Regular establishment. Still, the Joint Chiefs were dubious that a combat-ready Marine division could be in the objective area before November or December and they so advised CinCFE.

Major General Oliver P. Smith took command of the skeletonized 1st Marine Division, strength less than 3,500, on 25 July. At the month's end the first build-up for the depleted division began to arrive. The 1st Marine Division literally formed itself on its way to battle. When it staged out of Kobe, Japan, on 10 September, five days before the scheduled landing, it had under its immediate control only one infantry regiment, the newly activated 1st Marines.

The 1st Marines was not only untested; it had never had its battalions together at one time, and unit training above the company level was most sketchy; there had been no time for even so much as a regimental CPX.

The 5th Marines was scheduled to join the Division at the target but until almost the last minute it was doubtful if it could be shaken free of the Pusan perimeter fighting in time to make the landing.

The 7th Marines, the third infantry regiment organic to the Division, was still halfway around the world. Its 3d Battalion had to be literally plucked away from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

There were other problems. The Tank Battalion, which had trained with M4A3s (Shermans) with 105mm howitzers, suddenly found themselves the proud owners of M26s (Pershings) with 90mm guns, which most of the crews hadn't even driven, let alone fired.

Less obvious were the advantages the 1st Marine Division took with it. Hard

peacetime training had conditioned its individual Marines. Its Reservists were mature and seasoned and soon indistinguishable from its Regulars. Its officers and NCOs were for the most part professionals with long service and combat experience. The level of confidence was high.

The amphibious shipping which was assembled for the landing was a sorry specter of the vast invasion fleets which had been the rule during World War II. Of the 47 LSTs mustered for the assault, 30 were manned by Japanese. (It tickled the Marines' fancy that so many of their landing ships were crewed by one-time members of the Japanese Imperial Navy.)

The landing on 15 September 1950 began with the tidy seizure during the morning hours of offshore island Wolmido by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. The main landings took place in the evening (with a 1730 H-hour) with the 5th Marines and 1st Marines landing abreast. By that time a mixture of rain and smoke had so befogged the harbor that the unrehearsed landing got almost out of control. By what the manuals tritely call "small unit leadership" the Marines got themselves ashore, and unscrambled, and on their way to their first night's objectives. Luckily for all concerned, the resistance, gauged in terms of World War II experience, was light.

Once ashore, the component units and individuals quickly fitted themselves together into an efficient fighting organization which drove forward to the Han in a little more than a week. By the afternoon of 27 September, after some particularly mean fighting in and around the city, U. S. flags were flying in Seoul over both the Russian and the United States consulates.

This is a Marine history written about Marines. The authors, who also wrote Volume I of this series, are a fortuitous partnership of professional military historian and professional Marine. Captain Nicholas A. Canzona served through the operation about which he writes as a combat engineer. (He permits himself one personal reference in the text.)

Their method has been to build a framework from official records and then to flesh out this framework with interviews, both personal and by correspondence, with key participants. Consequently, the book is richly interlarded with names, unit designations, and statistics.

"Certain Degree of Preparation"

THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL: The Story of the Naval War of 1812
By C. S. Forester; edited by Lewis Gannett
Doubleday & Company, 1956
284 Pages; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by
COL. AARON A. GUNNER

The author of *Captain Horatio Horn-*

blower and other stirring books of the Royal Navy here offers us a view of the War of 1812 that could come from no other source. The authenticity of Forester's descriptions of naval warfare has been never questioned; in this book Forester combines his talent for story-telling with some hard research to produce a book that, for once, tells both sides of the sea (and lake) actions.

Forester, being Forester, concentrates on the naval action and barely mentions the land battles except as how they affected, or were affected by, the navies and the privateers. We have a fairly full statement of the problems that beset Britain as she fought Napoleon on the Continent and was forced to detach sorely needed resources to fight the United States. Wellington had more confidence in America's ability to stand off defeat than did Madison, who permitted his negotiators to conclude a peace that did not even mention the problem of impressment of American seamen, presumably the most important single cause of the war.

Time and again the author's conclusion about different naval actions is that when the Americans won it was a combination of superb gunnery and inspired command; in fact, the Americans had the best of it in gunnery because training and morale were both superior to that in the English ships, manned with pressed men. The American captains, at least the successful ones, possessed a combination of aggressiveness, professional competence and freedom from outmoded custom that gave them the necessary edge; some of the American ships, too, were far superior in ability to take punishment than their British adversaries.

When the British were finally able to make their blockade and raiding tactics stick, with a fleet roaming the Chesapeake at will, it was Congress rather than the starveling navy that brought about the situation. As Mr. Madison said after the peace was concluded: "A certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disaster in the onset, but afford also the best security for the continuance of peace." He recommended "the gradual advance of the naval establishment" and "adding discipline to the distinguished bravery of the militia." He hoped Congress would provide for "cultivating the military art in its several branches, under the liberal patronage of government." Amen!

Voice From the Past?

INTRODUCTION TO PACK TRANSPORT AND PACK ARTILLERY
By Major Michael F. Parrino
Queensland Publishing Company, 1956
155 Pages; one illustration; \$5.50

Reviewed by
COLONEL WILLIAM C. FOOTE

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showered on them in this "Introductory" book on pack transport and pack artillery.

The key to this book's main topic is its subtitle: "The Role of the Mule—Past and Present—In War and Peace." Roughly only one fifth of the text and appendices is devoted to pack, or mountain, artillery; four fifths going to animal transport, mules, packsaddlery and the mule-skinners.

We learn that pack artillery was first used at Perpignan in the fifteenth century.

The chapter on "The Future of Pack Artillery" is all too short and seems devoted to the past rather than to the future. The book gets down to a possible future for pack artillery in Appendix 1, "Some Notes on Pack Artillery," where it suggests that the helicopter may readily enhance the use of pack artillery by serving as an integral part rather than by replacing it completely; stating that the possibility of future "local action" wars makes it imperative to "divert" more attention to "this highly purposeful and noteworthy arm—pack artillery, with its ability to deliver fire power, including the deadliest weapon known to man, anywhere under any conditions." Presumably this means that pack artillery could employ atomic shells.

There are numerous errors and bases for arguments over interpretations. For instance, on page 70 appears this statement, quoted in part for brevity: "The 'Army' then, of course was the cavalry . . ." used in connection with our Indian Wars and the role of the Army in the settlement of the West. Obviously, the "Army" did not mean then just the cavalry, granting the usually colorful and often essential role it played then. War Department records, regimental histories and a host of well documented books will show that the infantry played the major role.

The book states: "The 10th Mountain Division, composed in the main of packers and pack artillery, played a major role in the defeat of the Germans in that mountainous country, although its impact was not felt until later in the war." General Mark Clark in his *Calculated Risk* says: "Meanwhile the 10th Mountain Division began arriving in Italy . . . This Division, which included some of the world's famous skiers, had been trained at Camp Hale, Colorado, and was equipped with weasels and other vehicles particularly adapted to use in snow and in the mountains." This reviewer is unable to state the relative proportions of pack transport and pack artillery *versus* special snow-adapted motor vehicles assigned to that unique division.

There are also annoying errors in spelling—the book is far from perfect but it is the best and most modern on the subject available today.

Neglected Navy

MR. LINCOLN'S ADMIRALS

By Clarence Edward Macartney
Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1956
335 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

The land campaigns of the Civil War may well be the most chewed-over in the history of warfare. Not so the sea war from 1861 to 1865. Could *you*, for example, name the admirals of the U. S. Navy in those years, and the principal engagements in which they commanded?

Probably you'd remember the brilliant, try-anything-once David D. Porter, whose brass-bound nerve got his ships into and out of places where nobody with any judgment would have taken ships at all. But Porter was inextricably linked with Grant's Vicksburg campaign, and has gotten his share of credit from historians.

Then there was Farragut, victor at New Orleans and Mobile bay, who, according to Professor Macartney, did *not* say, "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!" or anything like it.

On the East Coast, Samuel Francis Dupont reduced and seized Port Royal early in the war, and was then relieved for failure to recapture Fort Sumter and move on the port of Charleston. His successor, John A. B. Dahlgren, had little more success with Charleston, his most notable contribution to the war being the development of the Dahlgren gun.

Mr. Lincoln's fifth admiral, Andrew Hull Foote, preceded Porter in command of the Mississippi River Squadron, and was the victor in actions at Forts Henry and Donelson, and Island No. 10.

In addition to sketching the accomplishments of the five admirals, Macartney gives us brief portraits of four lower-ranking officers who achieved some fame: Winslow, who sank the Confederate raider *Alabama*; Worden, who commanded *Monitor* in her duel with *Virginia* (*Merrimack*); Collins, who snatched the raider *Florida* out of the Brazilian port of Bahia; and the incredible youngster, Cushing, who sank the Confederate ram *Albatross*, in a suicide torpedo attack, and survived.

There is a chapter too on Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, and his assistant, Gustavus Fox, who performed at least as efficiently in their department as Mr. Stanton did in the War Department, and did so without benefit of Stanton's periodic explosions.

This is by no means a naval history of the Civil War, though there are naturally brief accounts, with accompanying diagrams, of the chief engagements in which each of the commanders played a major part. It is, however, a good place to begin reading Civil War naval history, and has enough meat in it to whet the reader's appetite for further study.



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AUSA's New Council of Trustees

These thirteen gentlemen will take over the government of the Association of the U. S. Army during the annual meeting in October. Their first task will be to select two of the group to serve as President and Vice President.



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


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Report from your AUSA CP

Special Meeting of Executive Council AUSA was held on 9 August, just too late to include report in this AUSA CP. Agenda included consideration final plans for Annual Meeting (25, 26, 27 October, in Washington, if you haven't kept up with things) and discussion of regulations for chapter organization. Both items are important, represent long hours of work by Council members and large number of anonymous but devoted "Indians." Willingness of members to give their best efforts to betterment of Association, even though they are not listed as Association officers, is best evidence of Association's esteem among Pentagon personnel who realize how much the Army needs this Association.

The Adjutant General, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, backs up his whole-hearted belief in the Association by checking on AG participation in the organization. In a recent letter to Gen. Weible, our President, General Klein listed the following membership figures: The AG School, 75 new and 4 renewals; Alaska, 84% of AG officers; CONARC, all non-members indicated their desire to join; Fort Sill, 100% of AGs; The Infantry Center, 100% of AGs; SHAPE, all AGs not already members indicated their desire to join; Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Armies, continuing campaign.

New Association brochure mentioned in these pages last issue has gone to press three times in past two weeks. Over 35,000 have been distributed, with more requests coming in daily. Members may have individual copy by writing Secretary; bulk orders for unit and other membership project officers should be on official stationery. Staff is working overtime filling requests.

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components and providing for and assuring the Nation's military security." (Statement by the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army; adopted 14 December 1953.)

Something unusual is going on at the 27th Infantry, the famous Wolfhound regiment. Without fanfare, without any liaison between a project officer and the Association offices, memberships are coming in from this famous fighting organization in a steady stream. Almost every mail brings three or four new memberships. Officers and enlisted men both are signing up for Association membership at a great rate. Someone is doing a bang-up job for the Association -- the thanks of all of us here are tendered to the quiet and anonymous, but marvelously effective, spark plug who is conducting this campaign.

Association's new look (story on new governing body appears elsewhere in this issue) has brought quickened interest from many quarters. Item: Industry's eager participation in Annual Meeting, as evidenced by early booth rentals, and requests for information on sustaining memberships. Item: Requests from ROTC institutions, cities, Army posts, for information on forming local chapters. Item: Closer liaison with CINFC on promotion ideas to help Army tell the story; various CINFC project officers call Association to enlist help, get ideas, offer suggestions.

A guessing game that costs your Association many hundreds of dollars each year occurs when our members neglect to type or print their names and/or addresses on correspondence. Some of our circulation people, who have been around for many years, do a pretty fair job in identifying assorted chicken tracks, but it takes time and creates the possibility of error. When you write, when you renew your membership, and especially when you send in changes of address, don't only write, print your name.

Association plaques, in Burwood material, will be available about the middle of September. Plaques will duplicate Association seal, will be 13 inches in diameter, finished in simulated gold. Originally designed for decoration at First Annual Meeting, about fifty were made in plaster-of-paris, and were placed in key Army offices as decorations. Demand from rank-and-file has been insistent; result is trial order for 200. Sale price will be \$5.00. Backlog of orders is not large; those who want original decoration for office or den write Secretary. Whether plaques continue to be Association sale item depends on demand. Chapters will get one plaque as automatic issue.

We get many interesting booklets and pamphlets here at the office. The Association of American Railroads has produced a 72-page pamphlet titled: "Rail Transport and the Winning of Wars," by General James A. Van Fleet. Among other interesting material, the book tells, from historical example, just how difficult railroads are to stop by bombing attack. For your free copy, write to: Association of American Railroads, 924 Transportation Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Col. Henry C. Newton, long-time Association booster, retired at Fort Knox on 31 July. Assistant Commandant and Director of Instruction at The Armored School, Col. Newton received an honorary Doctor of Laws from Norwich University in June. The citation mentioned his long association with the Army school system. One of Col. Newton's last acts before leaving for a year of travel in Europe was to write to your Secretary asking for information and materials to help him plug the Association during his travels.

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vin is now Chief of Research and Development, U. S. Army. Many of the ideas he put into *Airborne Warfare* are now standard practice; others are still under development.

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